Income Taxation with Frictional Labor Supply by Werquin, Nicolas
Income Taxation with Frictional Labor Supply
Nicolas Werquin∗
April 2016
Abstract
I study nonlinear income taxation in a dynamic environment where
individual labor supply is subject to frictions, e.g., hours constraints
within firms. Specifically, consistent with the empirical evidence, agents
incur a fixed cost of adjusting their hours of work in response to wage
or tax changes. This generates an endogenous extensive margin of labor
supply, conditional on participation. I derive a formula that charac-
terizes the optimal long-run progressive tax schedule in this economy,
and show in particular that the standard frictionless models, which ig-
nore the lumpiness of labor supply, underestimate the long-run costs of
raising tax progressivity.
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Theoretical models of optimal labor income taxation typically assume that
labor supply can be adjusted costlessly and optimally on the intensive margin
in response to wage or tax changes: a 1 percent increase in the marginal tax
rate induces an ε percent decrease in hours of work or gross income. Given this
simple modeling of labor supply, optimal tax rates are then determined by the
trade-off between their effect on government revenue (including these behav-
ioral losses driven by the elasticity ε) and their effect on welfare, measured by
the marginal utility of consumption (normalized by the shadow value of public
funds, also called marginal social welfare weights). Even models of taxation
that incorporate explicitly an extensive margin of labor supply typically con-
sider the binary decision of whether to participate in the labor force, keeping
the assumption that conditional on participation, hours are either exogenously
fixed or fully flexible on the intensive margin.
One of the most common criticisms of this framework is that this modeling
of labor supply is unrealistic. A large (and growing) body of empirical evidence
shows that the adjustment of labor supply in response to productivity, wage
or tax changes, is subject to substantial frictions. The empirical literature
(e.g., among others, Altonji and Paxson (1992), Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and
Pistaferri (2011)) finds that workers face hour constraints set by firms and
must change jobs in order to adjust their hours of work. This entails large
fixed (search) costs. The presence of such fixed adjustment costs generates
endogenously an extensive margin of labor supply conditional on participation,
where the thresholds of adjustments (i.e., their timing and size) are chosen
optimally by the agent.
Despite this empirical evidence, there is little theoretical work that explic-
itly incorporates such labor supply adjustment frictions into models of income
taxation. The reason (besides tractability concerns) is that it is commonly
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believed, perhaps loosely, that in the long-run, when individuals have had the
time to fully adjust their labor supply, the effects of a tax change should be
accurately captured by the standard frictionless optimal tax formulas, where
ε is interpreted as a long-run labor supply elasticity; in other words, there
may exist short-run adjustment frictions and sluggish responses to taxes at
the individual level, but they become irrelevant in the long-run.
The question I address in this paper is whether long-run optimal taxes, in
a dynamic model with lumpy individual labor supply, differ from those derived
in the standard frictionless model with intensive margin behavior, and if so,
what are the theoretical forces that determine optimal policy in the frictional
economy.1 The main result is that the long-run effects of non-linear taxation
are not correctly captured by the frictionless tax formulas in the presence of
fixed costs at the micro level. I derive novel formulas for long-run optimal
taxes with lumpy labor supply and show that the frictionless tax formulas
implicitly make an implausibly strong assumption about the effects of wage
changes on optimal individual behavior.
I set up a dynamic model in which individuals choose their labor supply
as a function of their stochastic idiosyncratic wage shocks and the non-linear
tax schedule. In order to adjust their hours of work in response to wage or
tax changes, they must pay a fixed cost. This fixed adjustment cost can be
thought of as the cost of searching for a new job in an economy where hours
are constrained within the firm, and is assumed proportional to the worker’s
foregone utility of consumption from the search activity. Once they decide
1In this paper I call “long-run” the time until the new steady state of the economy
is reached after a tax change, which is driven by the time it takes for workers to react
and adjust their labor supply. This should be thought of as a horizon of, say, five to ten
years. I am not concerned with “very” responses to taxes which would take into account, for
instance, distorted human capital accumulation of future generations – a problem analyzed
by Stantcheva (2015), Findeisen and Sachs (2015), Badel and Huggett (2015).
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to pay the fixed cost, i.e., to start searching for a new job, they receive a
job offer (a costless adjustment opportunity) at an exogenous Poisson rate,
which captures in a reduced-form way the frictions on the demand side of the
labor market. Several assumptions allow me to keep the model analytically
tractable: the utility function has no income effects; the wage follows a random
growth process; the nonlinear tax schedule has a constant rate of progressiv-
ity; individuals are born (or enter the labor force) and die (or retire) at an
exogenous Poisson rate; and they cannot save or borrow. As a result, hours of
work evolve in a lumpy manner at the individual level: workers remain inac-
tive, that is they keep the same job, until their productivity (or wage) is such
that their optimal desired labor supply is far enough from their current, actual
labor supply; at this point, which I characterize analytically, they decide to
pay the fixed cost and start searching for a new job.2
The government chooses the tax schedule given this optimal individual
behavior. Its objective is to maximize a long-run utilitarian social objective
(the sum of individual value functions, weighted by the stationary distribution
of agents), subject to a budget constraint. In the frictionless model, the op-
timum tax schedule is characterized by sufficient statistic formulas standard
in the public finance literature. In the frictional model, I show two results.
First, the long-run effect on social welfare of a uniform increase in marginal
tax rates is given by the same formula as in the frictionless environment; this
neutrality result formalizes the intuition described in the third paragraph and
justifies the use of the frictionless intensive margin model for the analysis of
long-run (linear) taxation. Second, the long-run effect on social welfare of an
2For salaried workers, an alternative setup would place the fixed cost on income rather
than hours of work. All the results of this paper would continue to hold in this model, see
Werquin (2014) for details.
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increase in the progressivity of the tax schedule is not accurately captured by
the frictionless formula: it depends on several new (extensive margin) labor
supply elasticities and marginal social welfare weights. The main force is the
following. An increase in progressivity reduces the volatility of the income
process, as higher incomes are taxed at a higher rate. This indirectly reduces
the option value of waiting to adjust labor supply in response to wage changes.
The lumpiness of labor supply generates extensive margin effects on welfare
unless these two effects exactly cancel out. In other words, the frictionless
tax formula implicitly makes a strong assumption about the effect of taxes
on the option value, namely, that it is exactly as large as their effect on the
volatility of income shocks. However, the option value effect is typically negli-
gible relative to the direct volatility effect of raising progressivity: individuals
adjust their labor supply whenever their current hours of work are 10 percent
away (say) from their optimum, and this value is hardly affected by taxes.
Relative to the benchmark (frictionless equivalent) case where the two effects
exactly cancel out, an increase in progressivity leads to a wider dispersion of
individual incomes around their desired frictionless values, which adversely af-
fects welfare. I show numerically in a calibrated version of the model that the
magnitude of these effects can be large (the true welfare effects of raising taxes
differ by up to 7 percent from those computed using the frictionless formulas),
and is larger for smaller values of the labor supply elasticity ε.3
3There is another, “composition” effect of raising progressivity that is not captured by
the frictionless formulas: the presence of adjustment frictions implies that individuals who
earn the same income differ in their utility, as the least productive of them (i.e., those
with a lower wage) are working more hours to earn the same income; this non-degenerate
distribution is itself endogenous to the tax schedule. By treating the population earning a
given income as a representative agent, the frictionless model thus ignores this endogenous
heterogeneity and miscalculates the welfare effects of perturbing taxes.
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Related literature. This paper is related to three distinct strands in the
literature. First, it is motivated by the large empirical literature that points
to the presence of frictions in the adjustment of labor supply. Altonji and
Paxson (1992) show that changes in labor supply preferences have a much
larger effect on hours of work when individual change jobs, suggesting that
hours are constrained within firms and adjusting behavior entails substantial
fixed costs. Other papers have similarly argued that labor supply is subject to
fixed adjustment costs,4 e.g., Cogan (1981), Altonji and Paxson (1988), Dick-
ens and Lundberg (1993), Holmlund and Söderström (2008), Chetty, Guren,
Manoli, and Weber (2012), Gelber, Jones, and Sacks (2013). Two closely re-
lated papers to mine are Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011) and
Chetty (2012), who argue that adjustment frictions (in particular, fixed costs)
can reconcile several puzzles observed in the large literature that estimates la-
bor supply elasticities (see, e.g., Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) and Keane
and Rogerson (2012) for surveys), e.g., the wide range of empirical elasticity
estimates (from 0.1 to 1 for the micro Hicksian elasticity), or the fact that
larger tax changes generate larger responses. My contribution is to incorpo-
rate explicitly these fixed costs into a theoretical dynamic model and derive
the consequences for long-run optimal income taxes.
Second, this paper relates to the optimal taxation literature. The litera-
ture on the sufficient statistic approach to optimal taxation (e.g., Saez (2001),
Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2013), Hendren (2014, 2015), Jacquet and
Lehmann (2015), derive optimal tax formulas for a large class of underly-
ing functional forms for the utility function, the sources of heterogeneity, etc,
but generally assumes that labor supply is set optimally. Recently, Chetty,
4Other types of fixed costs than hour requirements within firms can also be present,
e.g., the cognitive cost of paying attention to a tax change.
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Looney, and Kroft (2009) and Farhi and Gabaix (2015) have extended these
results to cases with boundedly rational agents, but in static settings. My
focus is instead on the long-run effects of taxes in a dynamic environment,
when individuals have had the time to adjust their behavior in response to the
tax change.
This paper also relates to the literature on extensive margin labor supply re-
sponses to taxes: Saez (2002), Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), Shourideh and
Troshkin (2009), Chone and Laroque (2010), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2011),
Jacquet, Lehmann, and Van der Linden (2013), study optimal taxation models
where individuals face a fixed cost of working, leading to binary participation
decisions and an intensive margin of hours. Alvarez, Borovicková, and Shimer
(2015) model labor supply in a similar way as I do in this paper, although
they consider only one adjustment (participation) threshold and do not focus
on optimal taxation. My paper can be seen as a generalization of their in-
sights, by deriving tax formulas that account for the many more (endogenous)
extensive margins of labor supply observed in practice, conditional on partici-
pation. It would be straightforward to include an explicit participation margin
in my setting (similar to Alvarez, Borovicková, and Shimer (2015)), although
empirically the long-run responses to taxation seems to be driven mostly by
hours worked conditional on employment (see Davis and Henrekson (2004),
and Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2012) for analyses of labor supply
across countries with different tax regimes).
Finally, the technical tools that I use to model lumpy individual behavior
are those developed in the impulse control literature originally developed to
analyze operations research questions. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Stokey
(2008) summarize many references and applications of these models to eco-
nomics, primarily for monetary and investment topics. To cite only a few re-
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cent papers, Caplin and Leahy (1991), Bertola and Caballero (1990), Grossman
and Laroque (1990), Caballero and Engel (1999), Alvarez and Lippi (2014),
and Alvarez, Bihan, and Lippi (2014), have made important economic con-
tributions to this literature, on which this paper builds. I contribute to this
literature by studying long-run optimal policy in this class of models.5 Finally,
in public finance, there is a rich literature on investment in the presence of
adjustment costs: Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Summers (1981), Abel (1983),
Auerbach and Hines Jr (1987), Auerbach (1989), Auerbach and Hassett (1992).
I bring this literature to the study of labor supply, since labor supply (and not
just capital) adjustment costs are important.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the environment
and describes the maximization problems of the individual and the govern-
ment. Section 3 analyzes the optimal individual behavior. Section 4 charac-
terizes the aggregate steady-state of the economy. Section 5 derives the main
formulas for optimal taxes. Section 6 calibrates the model and runs numerical
exercises. Section 7 concludes. The proofs of all the results and additional
details are gathered in the Appendix.
5This paper finds that non-linear policy tools interact with fixed adjustment costs to
yield long-run aggregate real effects on welfare. This is in contrast with many papers with
indivisibilities or fixed costs at the micro level, where the aggregate economy behaves as a
frictionless (representative agent) model (e.g., Caplin and Spulber (1987), Rogerson (1988)).
I show in this paper that this insight holds only if the available policy instruments are linear.
This insight could be applied more generally to models with fixed costs and non-linear policy
instruments, beyond the taxation framework.
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1 Environment
There is a continuum of mass one of individuals in the economy. Time is
continuous.
Preferences. Individuals have the following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Huffman (1988) utility of consumption c and hours of work (labor supply)
h, with isoelastic disutility of labor:
U (c, h) =
1
1− γ
(
c− 1
1 + 1/ε
h1+1/ε
)1−γ
, (1)
with γ ∈ [0, 1). They discount the future at rate ρ1. They are born (or enter
the labor force) and die (or retire) at an exogenous and constant Poisson rate
ρ2. I denote g (x) = (1− γ)−1 x1−γ.
Technology. Individual productivity θ is exogenous. The production func-
tion is linear in the labor input, so that workers’ wages wt are equal to θt
for all t ≥ 0. An individual’s log-wage (i.e., log-productivity) at birth, w0,
is drawn from a normal distribution flnw0 (·) with mean mw and variance s2w.
The idiosyncratic wage wt then evolves stochastically over time according to
a geometric Brownian motion with drift µw and volatility σw:
d lnwt = µwdt+ σwdWt, (2)
The reduced-form equation (2) for the exogenous wage process can be micro-
founded.6 A large empirical literature7 estimates wage specifications of this
form and its findings are consistent with the presence of a unit root in the
6See, e.g. Gabaix, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2015) and the references therein.
7See Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) for a survey.
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wage process wt.8
Budget constraint and taxes. An individual with wage w who works
h hours earns taxable labor income y = w × h and pays taxes T (y) to the
government. I assume that she cannot save or borrow, so that her consumption
equals her net income, c = y−T (y). The tax-and-transfer system is restricted
within a class of two-parameter tax schedules, defined as
T (y) = y − 1− τ
1− py
1−p, (3)
with τ ∈ R and p ∈ (−∞, 1). If p = 0, the income tax schedule is linear with
constant marginal tax rate τ . If p ∈ (0, 1), the ratio of the marginal tax rate
to the average tax rate is T ′ (y) / [T (y) /y] > 1, so that the tax schedule is
progressive; if p < 0, the tax schedule is regressive. The parameter p is the
coefficient of marginal rate progression.9 It is equal to the elasticity of the
net-of-tax rate with respect to taxable income,
p = −d ln (1− T
′ (y))
d ln y
.
This functional form for the tax schedule approximates extremely accurately
the U.S. tax system.10 Figure 2 in the Appendix plots this tax function cali-
brated to the U.S. tax code (p = 0.151).
8The results of this paper would not be affected if wages were allowed to jump. This
extension (letting jumps be drawn from a double-Pareto distribution) would also make the
wage process consistent with the evidence presented in Guvenen, Song, Ozkan, and Karahan
(2015), who find that the distribution of income growth rates d lnwt has Pareto tails.
9See Musgrave and Thin (1948). Recent papers by Benabou (2002) and Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2014) study optimal taxes using this functional form assumption.
10See Figure 1.(a) in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014). They fit this tax
function to the PSID data and find an R2 equal to 0.96.
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Individual problem. In a frictionless environment, individuals choose their
labor supply ht optimally and costlessly at every instant t. A worker with
current wage w0 solves
V∗ (w0) = max{ht}t≥0
E0
[ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tU (wtht − T (wtht) , ht) dt
]
, (4)
subject to (2). The solution to this problem gives the agent’s frictionless,
or desired, labor supply {h∗t}t≥0, consumption {c∗t}t≥0, and value function
V∗ (w0).
I now suppose that in order to adjust their labor supply from h to h′,
individuals must pay a fixed utility cost κ ≥ 0, which can be interpreted as
the search cost of finding a new job.11 After paying this fixed adjustment
cost, a job offer arrives at rate q > 0, at which time the agent can costlessly
and optimally adjust her hours; intuitively, q captures in a reduced-form way
the frictions on the demand side of the labor market.12 I assume that κ is
proportional to the utility from the foregone (frictionless) disposable income
due to the search activity, which is itself proportional to the instantaneous
utility g (c∗0):13
κ = κ˜× E0
[ˆ τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tU (c∗t , h
∗
t ) dt
]
= κ× g (c∗0) , (5)
with κ ≥ 0 and τˆ is the Poisson random time at which a job offer is received
after paying the fixed cost at time 0 (the second equality is proved in the
11See the empirical evidence presented in, e.g., Altonji and Paxson (1992) and Chetty,
Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011).
12In this paper I focus on the labor supply effects of taxation, and thus assume that q is
exogenous to taxes.
13Assuming γ < 1 in (1) ensures that the fixed cost κ is strictly positive and increasing
in income.
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Appendix). When κ > 0 and q = ∞, the environment reduces to an (S, s)14
model. When κ = 0 and q <∞, it becomes a model à la Calvo (1983).15
In this frictional environment, individuals decide when and by how much
to adjust their labor supply as their wage evolves. They can choose their
hours optimally and costlessly at birth. I define an impulse control policy p
as a sequence of stopping times (at which the fixed adjustment cost is paid)
0 < τ1 < . . . < τi < . . . adapted to the filtration {Ft} generated by Wt,
and a sequence of random variables (the jumps in log-hours upon receiving
an adjustment offer) ∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆i, . . ., constructed inductively as follows.
Let τ0 = τˆ0 = 0 and {τˆi}i≥1 be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with
exponential distribution E (q), i.e., P (τˆi ≥ t) = e−qt for all t ≥ 0. For all i ≥ 0,
∆i ∈ R is measurable with respect to the minimum σ-algebra Fτi+τˆi of events
up to time τi + τˆi, and τi+1 > τi + τˆi. I denote by P the set of such impulse
control policies p.
An individual with current wage w0 who just received an adjustment offer
chooses hours h0 and a stopping time τ1 > 0 (the next time at which he will
14See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Stokey (2008), and the references therein.
15In a previous version of this paper (Werquin (2014)), I considered salaried workers
instead, and assumed that the total taxable income y, rather than hours h, is subject to
the fixed adjustment cost. In this case, w and h are interpreted respectively as productivity
and effort, and their product y is the agent’s effective labor supply, or income. As the
individual becomes more productive and stays in her current job (w increases and y remains
constant), she needs to provide less effort (h decreases) to produce the required amount
y. She adjusts her income upwards (resp., downwards) when she becomes so productive
(resp., unproductive) that she spends most of her time idle (resp., when she must provide
too much effort) to produce y. The results of the paper are unaffected by this alternative
specification.
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pay the fixed cost) to solve:
V˜ (w0) = max{h0,τ1} E0
[ˆ ∞
0
qe−qτˆ
{ˆ τ1+τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tU (wth0 − T (wth0) , h0) dt
− e−(ρ1+ρ2)τ1κτ1 + e−(ρ1+ρ2)(τ1+τˆ1)V˜
(
wτ1+τˆ1
)}
dτˆ
]
,
(6)
subject to (2). An individual is “inactive” if she has not yet paid the fixed
adjustment cost since she started working at her current job, and is “search-
ing” otherwise. Let Vi (w, h) and Vs (w, h) denote the corresponding value
functions.
Government’s problem. The government chooses the tax schedule (τ, p)
to maximize long-run utilitarian social welfare16 over all living individuals,
subject to a budget balance constraint with an exogenous revenue requirement
R¯. Assuming their existence, let f iw,h (·, ·) and f sw,h (·, ·) denote the stationary
joint densities of wages w and hours h for inactive and searching individuals,
respectively. The government solves:
max{τ,p}
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
0
∑
x∈{i,s}
Vx (w, h) fxw,h (w, h) dwdh (7)
s.t.
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
0
∑
x∈{i,s}
T (wh) fxw,h (w, h) dwdh ≥ R¯. (8)
Let λ denote the marginal value of public funds, i.e. the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the budget constraint (8), R (T ) denote tax revenue, i.e. the
left-hand side of (8), and W (T ) denote social welfare expressed in monetary
units, i.e. the maximand in (7) normalized by λ.
16Due to the assumption of exponential deaths, individuals receive equal weights inde-
pendently of their age.
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2 Individual behavior
Frictionless model. The first-order conditions of the frictionless problem
(4) imply that the individual’s optimal labor supply h∗t at each instant t is
an increasing function of her wage wt and her net-of-tax rate (1− T ′ (wth∗t )).
The frictionless taxable income y∗t = wth∗t and disposable income c∗t are then
given by the following expressions as functions of the labor supply elasticity
and the parameters of the tax schedule:
y∗t = (1− T ′ (y∗t ))εw1+εt = (1− τ)
ε
1+pε w
1+ε
1+pε
t ,
c∗t =y
∗
t − T (y∗t ) =
1
1− p (1− τ)
1+ε
1+pε w
(1−p)(1+ε)
1+pε
t .
(9)
Equations (9) imply that the effects of taxes on frictionless incomes at each
time t are given by
d ln y∗
d ln (1− τ) =
ε
1 + pε
, and
d ln y∗
dp
= − ε
1 + pε
ln y∗. (10)
The interpretation is as follows. The behavioral change in income y∗ following
a tax increase (both in τ and p) is determined by the elasticity ε. If the baseline
tax system is linear, i.e. p = 0, (10) implies immediately that the elasticity of
labor income y∗ with respect to the net-of tax rate 1− τ is equal to ε. If the
baseline tax system is non-linear, i.e. p 6= 0, a change in the marginal tax rate
T ′ (y∗) induces a direct reduction of labor income y∗ by ε, which triggers in
turn an indirect change d (T ′ (y)) = T ′′ (y) dy in the marginal tax rate faced
by the individual, due to the non-linearity of the tax schedule, and hence a
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further income adjustment. Therefore
d ln y∗
d ln (1− T ′ (y∗)) =
ε
1 + T ′′ (y∗) y
∗ε
1−T ′(y∗)
=
ε
1 + pε
. (11)
Thus the effect on income of a perturbation of the parameter (1− τ) is equiva-
lent to uniformly perturbing by the same amount the net-of tax rates (1− T ′ (y)),
while a perturbation of p is equivalent to perturbing the marginal tax rates at
each income level by an amount proportional to log-income.
Equations (9) imply moreover that taxable and disposable incomes evolve
according to random growth processes with endogenous drifts and volatilities:
d ln y∗t = µydt+ σydWt, with {µy, σy} =
1 + ε
1 + pε
{µw, σw} , (12)
d ln c∗t = µcdt+ σcdWt, with {µc, σc} = (1− p)
1 + ε
1 + pε
{µw, σw} .(13)
These expressions show that a higher rate of progressivity of the tax schedule
lowers the drift and the volatility of both the taxable and the disposable income
processes,
d ln {|µy| , |σy|}
dp
= − ε
1 + pε
, and
d ln {|µc| , |σc|}
dp
= − 1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
. (14)
Intuitively, individual income responses to increases in wages are attenuated
by the fact that higher incomes pay higher marginal tax rates if the tax sched-
ule is progressive, so that tax progressivity dampens the volatility of income
fluctuations. A uniform change in the marginal tax rates (i.e., a change in τ),
on the other hand, does not affect the volatility of the income processes since
all incomes are shifted by a proportional amount.
I assume that ρ ≡ ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c > 0, which ensures
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that lifetime utility is finite. The value function V∗ (y) of an individual with
income y is given by (see Appendix):
V∗ (y) = 1
ρ
g
(
1 + pε
1 + ε
1− τ
1− py
1−p
)
. (15)
Note that ρ depends on the growth rate of (the utility from) consumption,
so that the relevant discount rate to compute the present value of utility is
endogenous to taxes.
Frictional model. To analyze the frictional problem (6), introduce the labor
supply deviation δ, defined as the log-difference between the actual and the
frictionless hours of work h and h∗,
δt ≡ ln (ht)− ln (h∗t ) = ln (yt)− ln (y∗t ) . (16)
While the individual remains inactive, δt evolves according to
dδt =− d lnh∗t = µδdt+ σδdWt, with {µδ, σδ} = −
(1− p) ε
1 + pε
{µw, σw} ,
(17)
and when she adjusts her labor supply from h to h′ at time τˆ, it jumps from
δτˆ− to δτˆ− + (lnh
′ − lnh).
We can replace the state variables (w, h) by either (y∗, δ) or (y, δ) in the
individual’s problem. I denote accordingly the utility and value functions by
U (y∗, δ), Vx (y∗, δ) for x ∈ {i, s}, and the value function of an individual with
actual, rather than frictionless, income y as Vˆx (y, δ) ≡ Vx
(
ye−δ, δ
)
. I finally
denote by V¯ (y, δ) the average (over employment states x) welfare of individuals
with states (y, δ) (see Appendix for a formal definition).
In the Appendix I show that the utility function can be written as U (y∗, δ) =
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u (δ)× g (c∗), where u (δ) is (approximately) quadratic around the frictionless
optimum δ = 0.17 The homogeneity of the utility function and of the fixed ad-
justment cost (5), along with the random growth processes for the frictionless
disposable income (13), allow us to crucially reduce the dimensionality of the
state space.18
Proposition 1. The policy functions and the value functions of inactive and
searching individuals with frictionless taxable income y∗ and labor supply devi-
ation δ are homogeneous of degree one in the utility of frictionless consumption
g (c∗):
Vx (y∗, δ) = vx (δ)× g
(
1− τ
1− py
∗(1−p)
)
, ∀x ∈ {i, s} , (18)
for some functions vi, vs : R→ R.
Proof. See Appendix. The value functions vi (δ) , vs (δ) are defined formally in
(42) and plotted in Figure 3.
An implication of Proposition 1 and equation (15) is that the value func-
tions Vˆx (y, δ) of individuals with income y and deviation δ can be expressed
as the value V∗ (y) that the planner would compute for an individual with
income y wrongly assuming that the world is frictionless, times a correction
factor vˆx (δ) which depends only on her (unobservable) labor supply deviation
δ. Unlike in the frictionless environment, where there is a representative agent
at each income level y, there is now a heterogeneous population of individuals
who earn the same income y but reach different levels of utility, because their
17Because the exact expression (derived in the Appendix) for the function u (δ) is not
well defined for δ far away from 0, I assume for simplicity that the utility loss from failing
to optimize is given by its quadratic approximation for any δ ∈ R. Alternatively we can
keep the exact expression if γ = 0, and add curvature to the social welfare function to give
the government a redistributive motive; none of the qualitative results would be affected.
18See Alvarez and Stokey (1998) for a general analysis of this property.
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wage-hour bundles (i.e., their deviation δ) and their employment state x (inac-
tive or searching) differ.19 This heterogeneity is summarized by the functions
vˆx (δ) which are strictly decreasing in δ (individuals who work less but earn
the same income are better off) and are endogenous to tax policy (see Figure
4 and Appendix for details).
I now analyze the solution to the impulse control problem (6). Define a
“
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
-policy”, where δ < δ∗ < δ¯, as follows. For any labor supply h, the
individual remains inactive as long as the state process δt is in
(
δ, δ¯
)
. When
δt hits or is below δ or above δ¯, she pays the fixed cost κ and waits until
she receives an adjustment opportunity, which occurs at the random time
τˆ ∼ E (q). She then adjusts the state to δ∗, so that hours jump from h to
h′ = h exp
(
δ∗ − δτˆ−
)
.
To find the solution to the individual’s problem and characterize her opti-
mal labor supply behavior, guess that the optimal control is a
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
-policy.
The value of inaction vi (δ) must satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation within the inaction region: ∀δ ∈ (δ, δ¯),
Lvi (δ)−ρvi (δ) = −u (δ) , where Lv ≡ 1
2
σ2δv
′′+ [µδ + (1− γ)σcσδ] v′, (19)
which has a standard asset pricing interpretation (see Appendix), subject to
the following boundary conditions: (i) value-matching,
vi
(
δ¯
)
= vs
(
δ¯
)− κ, and vi (δ) = vs (δ)− κ, (20)
which impose that at the time the agent decides to pay the fixed cost and search
19A key friction in this paper is that the government is restricted to using a tax T (·) on
observed incomes y, and hence cannot differentiate between various individuals who earn
the same amount but have different wage-hour pairs and employment states.
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for a new job she is indifferent between doing so and remaining inactive; (ii)
smooth-pasting,
v′i
(
δ¯+
)
= v′i
(
δ¯−
)
= v′s
(
δ¯
)
, and v′i
(
δ+
)
= v′i
(
δ−
)
= v′s (δ) , (21)
which impose that at the time the agent decides to pay the fixed cost the
marginal value and the marginal cost of starting to search are equal; and (iii)
optimality,
v′i (δ
∗) = 0, (22)
which imposes that the value function at the optimal adjustment target δ∗ is
maximized. The value of searching vs (δ) is equal to the sum of: the flow utility
from the time at which the fixed cost is paid until the adjustment occurs; and
the expected value of returning to δ∗. That is, for all δ ∈ R, letting τˆ ∼ E (q),
vs (δ) = E0
[ˆ τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tU (y∗t , δt) dt
∣∣∣∣∣ δ0 = δ
]
+
q
ρ+ q
vi (δ
∗) . (23)
Equation (44) in the Appendix gives a closed-form expression for vs (δ). I also
show a heuristic derivation of this system of equations (19)-(23), and provide
detailed interpretations.
The following proposition shows under which conditions the
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
-
policy described above is the solution to the individual’s problem:20
Proposition 2. Suppose that there exist δ < δ∗ < δ¯ and vi ∈ C1 (R) ∩
C2 (R \ {δ, δ¯}) that solve the system of equations (19) to (23). Suppose more-
20Note that equations (19) to (23) define a free-boundary problem, as the boundaries
of the inaction region are part of the solution
(
vi, vs, δ, δ
∗, δ¯
)
. For any set of three fixed
(potentially suboptimal) thresholds δ < δ∗ < δ¯, equations (19), (20) and (23) define a
fixed-boundary problem which can be solved in closed-form by integrating the second-order
differential equation and inverting the linear system of two equations and two unknowns
formed by the boundary conditions.
19
over that the following quasi-variational inequalities hold: Lvs−ρvs ≤ −u for
all δ ∈ R \ (δ, δ¯) and vi ≥ vs − κ for all δ ∈ (δ, δ¯), and that the technical con-
dition (48) in the Appendix is satisfied. Then vi and vs are the value functions
of inactives and searchers, respectively, and the optimal impulse control policy
is the
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
-policy.
Proof. See Appendix.
Individual labor supply behavior is depicted graphically in Figure 1. The
variable on the x-axis is the individual’s frictionless labor supply h∗, and that
on the y-axis is her actual labor supply h. In the frictionless environment, labor
supply would evolve along the 45°-line. In the frictional environment, labor
supply is lumpy: an inactive individual moves along a horizontal (red) line,
that is, her actual labor supply h stays constant while her desired labor supply
h∗ tracks the evolution of her productivity. When she reaches the (optimally
chosen) boundaries of her inaction region (the thick blue lines h∗ = e−δ¯h or
h∗ = e−δh), she starts searching and, as soon as she receives an offer, she
adjusts (up or down) to the new labor supply level on the central blue line
h′ = eδ
∗
h∗.
20
Figure 1: Optimal labor supply behavior
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The optimal labor supply adjustment behavior
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
is not affected by
the parameter τ of the tax schedule, while a lower progressivity p increases
the size of the inaction region:
d ln
{|δ| , δ¯}
d ln (1− τ) = 0, and
d ln
{|δ| , δ¯}
dp
< 0.
This is because a decrease in p acts as a positive volatility shock (see equation
(14)), i.e., it increases the volatilities σy, σδ of the income and the deviation
processes. This in turn raises the option value of waiting to adjust labor supply,
and therefore widens the optimal inaction region. Intuitively, a less progressive
tax schedule magnifies the unexpected shocks to the wage, which raises the
21
incentives for the individual to keep her current job and wait to observe the
evolution of her productivity before carrying out the costly adjustment, in
order to save on new search costs.
It follows that a lower rate of progressivity has an ambiguous effect on the
frequency of adjustment of labor supply: on the one hand, the higher volatility
of the deviation process makes current labor supply diverge from its frictionless
optimum at a faster rate, so that individuals reach more quickly the bound-
aries of their inaction region; on the other hand, the inaction region is wider,
which tends to make them adjust less often. Importantly, there is no reason
to expect a priori that the (direct) volatility-dampening effect of progressivity
has exactly the same magnitude as the (indirect) option value effect on the
boundaries of the inaction region; in fact, the reduction in the volatility of
income typically vastly dominates the option value effect.21 Another way to
express this heuristically is to say that an individual adjusts her labor supply
in response to productivity changes whenever her current hours of work are 10
percent (say) away from their optimum amount, and this maximum tolerated
deviation is hardly affected by taxes. On the other hand, progressivity has a
large dampening effect on the volatility of income fluctuations. The discrep-
ancy between these two opposing forces plays a crucial role in the optimal
taxation analysis of Section 4.
Figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix show the optimal thresholds δ, δ∗, δ¯, the
value functions vi (δ) , vs (δ) and vˆi (δ) , vˆs (δ), and their responses to a change
21Hence a less progressive tax schedule increases the frequency of adjustment. This result,
which I show numerically in Section 5, is common to all the papers in this literature, see
e.g. Vavra (2014) (with the exception of Bloom (2009), because he focuses on the impact
effect of shocks, rather than on the long-run effects). Theoretically, Dixit (1993) shows in
a simple version of the model that the option value effect is several orders of magnitude
smaller than the direct volatility effect. The optimal taxation formulas I derive in Section
4 hold of course for any relative value of these two opposing forces.
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in progressivity.
3 Aggregation
In this section I characterize the long-run wage and income distributions ob-
tained by aggregating the optimal individual policies described in Section 2.
3.1 Stationary wage distribution
A variable x has a double-Pareto-lognormal distribution (DPLN) (or lnx has
a Normal-Laplace distribution) with parameters (r1, r2,m, s2) (where r1 < 0 <
r2) if its density is given by
fx (x) =
|r1| r2
|r1|+ r2
{
e
1
2
r21s
2−r1mxr1−1Φ
(
lnx−m
s
+ r1s
)
+e
1
2
r22s
2−r2mxr2−1Φc
(
lnx−m
s
+ r2s
)}
.
(24)
The double-Pareto-lognormal distribution closely approximates the actual wage
and income distributions observed empirically.22 In particular, the DPLN dis-
tribution exhibits power-law behavior in both tails, with Pareto coefficients on
the right and left tail respectively given by (r1, r2), that is,
fx (x) ∼
x→0
wr2−1, and fx (x) ∼
x→∞
wr1−1. (25)
Define, for any x ∈ {w, y, c, δ} and ρ > 0,
rρ1,x ≡
µx
σ2x
−
√
µ2x
σ4x
+
2ρ
σ2x
, and rρ2,x ≡
µx
σ2x
+
√
µ2x
σ4x
+
2ρ
σ2x
, (26)
22See, e.g., Reed (2003), Reed and Jorgensen (2004), Toda (2012).
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The following proposition shows that the wage distribution converges to a
DPLN stationary distribution:
Proposition 3. The distribution of wages w converges towards a unique sta-
tionary distribution fw (·) which is double-Pareto-lognormal with parameters(
rρ21,w, r
ρ2
2,w,mw, s
2
w
)
, where rρ21,w, r
ρ2
2,w are defined in (26) and mw, s2w are the mean
and variance of the log-wage distribution at birth.23
Proof. See Toda (2012).
The aggregation of the random growth individual wage processes naturally
generates the wage distribution’s Pareto tails,24 which is one of the most ro-
bust empirical stylized facts (as well as an important determinant of optimal
taxes, see Saez (2001)). The smaller the Pareto coefficient (in absolute value)∣∣rρ21,w∣∣, the thicker the right tail, the more unequal the distribution. A higher
drift µw and volatility σw, and a lower death rate ρ2, lead to a more unequal
distribution.
3.2 Stationary income distributions
I now characterize the stationary joint distributions f iln y∗,δ and f sln y∗,δ of fric-
tionless taxable incomes ln y∗ and labor supply deviations δ for inactive and
searching individuals, respectively. Denote by f1, f2 their partial derivatives
with respect to the first and second variables, and by f11, f12, f22 their second
partial derivatives. We have f i = 0 for all δ < δ and δ > δ¯. Moreover, for all
ln y∗ ∈ R, all δ ∈ (δ, δ∗)∪(δ∗, δ¯) if f = f i, and all δ ∈ R\{δ, δ¯} if f = f s, these
23The frictionless taxable and disposable incomes y∗, c∗ are also log-normally distributed
at birth with respective mean and variance (my, sy) and (mc, sc) and follow random growth
processes (12,13) from then on. Hence their stationary distributions fy∗ , fc∗ are also double-
Pareto lognormal with respective parameters
(
rρ21,y, r
ρ2
2,y,my, s
2
y
)
and
(
rρ21,c, r
ρ2
2,c,mc, s
2
c
)
.
24See, e.g., Nirei and Souma (2007), Gabaix (2009).
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distributions are the solutions to the following Kolmogorov-forward equations
(KFE):
0 = − (ρ2 + qIfs) f − µyf1 + µδf2 + 1
2
σ2yf11 +
1
2
σ2δf22 − σyσδf12, (27)
where Ifs is equal to one if f = f sln y∗,δ and zero if f = f iln y∗,δ. The boundary
conditions and the derivation and interpretation of these equations, which
equate the inflows and outflows at any (ln y∗, δ) ∈ R2, are laid out in the
Appendix.
Proposition 4. Assuming their existence, the stationary distributions f iln y∗,δ
and f sln y∗,δ of inactive and searching individuals are the solution to the Kolmogorov-
forward partial differential equations (27) subject to the boundary conditions
(49), (50), (51), (52), (53), (54), and (55) in the Appendix. If q = ∞ the
stationary distributions of taxable and disposable incomes fy, fc have Pareto
right and left tails with respective coefficients
(
rρ21,y, r
ρ2
2,y
)
and
(
rρ21,c, r
ρ2
2,c
)
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Ignoring the search period for simplicity (q = ∞), Proposition 4 shows
that the Pareto coefficients of the tails of the taxable and disposable income
distributions are given in closed form by
{
rρ21,y, r
ρ2
2,y
}
=
1 + pε
1 + ε
{
rρ21,w, r
ρ2
2,w
}
, and
{
rρ21,c, r
ρ2
2,c
}
=
1
1− p
1 + pε
1 + ε
{
rρ21,w, r
ρ2
2,w
}
.
(28)
These expressions show that the labor supply elasticity ε and the progressiv-
ity p determine the amount by which inequality in exogenous productivities
(measured by the Pareto coefficient rρ21,w) translates into inequality in tax-
able and disposable incomes. The distribution of taxable income y is more
25
unequal (thicker tail) than the wage distribution, because wage differences
are amplified by the labor supply responses due to the positive elasticity ε.25
Moreover, both the before-tax and (more strongly so) the after-tax income
distributions become more equal when the tax schedule is more progressive:
d
dp
ln
∣∣rρ21,c∣∣ > ddp ln ∣∣rρ21,y∣∣ > 0.26 Figure 5 in the Appendix summarizes these
results graphically and plots the stationary distributions of wages w, incomes
y, c, and labor supply deviations δ, as well as the effects of taxes on these
distributions.
4 Optimal taxation
In this section, I analyze the effects of taxes on long-run social welfare (com-
parative statics across steady-states) in order to characterize the optimal tax
schedule, that is, the solution to the government’s problem (7,8), given that in-
dividual labor supply is characterized by Proposition 2. Before deriving these
formulas, I formally define and characterize two sets of key variables for the
analysis of tax policy: the labor income elasticities and the marginal social
welfare weights.
4.1 Labor income elasticities
I first define the (Hicksian) frictionless intensive margin labor income elastic-
ity, ε∗ (y∗), as the elasticity of an individual’s frictionless taxable income y∗
with respect to the net of tax rate (1− T ′ (y∗)). We saw in Section 2 that
25This is consistent with the findings of Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri, and Violante (2010).
26Note also that rρ21,y ≤ rρ21,c < rρ21,w if p ≥ 0 and rρ21,c ≤ rρ21,y < rρ21,w if p ≤ 0, with strict
inequalities if p 6= 0, so that the distribution of frictionless disposable income is less unequal
than the distribution of desired taxable income if and only if the tax schedule is progressive.
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this elasticity is constant accross individuals and is given by the (normalized)
structural elasticity parameter ε.
Definition 1. The frictionless intensive margin labor income elasticity is de-
fined as
ε∗ (y∗) ≡ d ln y
∗
d ln (1− T ′ (y∗)) =
ε
1 + pε
, ∀y∗ ∈ R+, (29)
where the second equality follows from equations (10) and (11).
In a frictionless world (κ = 0), this variable ε∗ (y) would be equal to the
response of the individual’s true income to a change in marginal tax rates. It
could be estimated empirically by observing the magnitude of the change in
income following a change in statutory net-of-tax rates (see, e.g., Gruber and
Saez (2002)). However, when the adjustment of labor supply in response to
tax changes is frictional (κ > 0), the individual elasticity of actual (observed)
income is not well defined: it is in general equal to zero, if the agent has not yet
adjusted her income in response to the tax change, and is infinite at the time of
adjustment since a small tax increase then induces a discrete jump in income.
In this environment we can nevertheless define and observe empirically the
long-run elasticity of aggregate labor income with respect to a uniform change
in net-of-tax rates (that is, a change in (1− τ)). Formally,
Definition 2. The macro labor income elasticity E is defined as
E ≡ d ln
´∞
0
yfy (y) dy
d ln (1− τ) , (30)
where fy (·) is the stationary density of incomes.
The following proposition proves a neutrality result that characterizes the
relationship between the frictionless individual elasticity and the macro elas-
ticity:
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Proposition 5. The frictionless intensive margin elasticity and the macro
elasticity are equal, that is,
E = ε∗ (y) =
ε
1 + pε
, ∀y ∈ R+. (31)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that in the frictional model, the long-run aggregate
income elasticity E is equal to the elasticity of frictionless individual income
ε∗, even though there is always (even in the steady-state) a non-degenerate
distribution of individuals with actual incomes y at each frictionless level y∗.
Intuitively, in the long-run, individuals have had the time to fully adjust their
behavior to the new tax schedule and even though they almost never actually
earn their desired income y∗, the individual errors wash out in the aggregate:
after the tax change, individuals revolve around their new optimum which
is ε percent away from the previous one, so that the aggregate (log-)income
distribution is uniformly shifted by ε. In other words, in the case of a uniform
increase in the net-of-tax rates (i.e., a change in the parameter τ), the economy
behaves in the long-run as if there were a representative frictionless agent at
each income level.27,28 Note in particular that this result allows us to recover
empirically the structural parameter ε when individual labor supply is lumpy.
Next, I define three extensive margin labor income elasticities as the ef-
27This neutrality result is related to those of Caplin and Spulber (1987) and Rogerson
(1988) who build models where frictions at the micro (individual) level are irrelevant at the
macro (aggregate) level.
28This neutrality result formalizes the intuition (explained in the Introduction of this
paper) that the standard frictionless model should be interpreted as the long-run outcome
of an environment with sluggish adjustments in the short-run. Of course this result depends
on the assumptions I have made in the previous sections about individual behavior. It
should be interpreted as follows: the assumptions of my model are giving the strongest
possible chances to the frictionless model’s tax formulas (39), (40) to capture the long-run
effects of taxation in the frictional environment.
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fects of changes in the adjustment thresholds δ, δ∗, δ¯ on the stationary income
distribution.
Definition 3. The extensive margin labor income elasticities Ξ (y), Ξ∗ (y),
and Ξ¯ (y) are defined as
Ξ (y) ≡ ∂ ln fy (y)
∂ ln |δ| , Ξ
∗ (y) ≡ ∂ ln fy (y)
∂ ln |δ∗| , and Ξ¯ (y) ≡
∂ ln fy (y)
∂ ln δ¯
, (32)
where fy (·) is the stationary density of incomes.
These elasticities capture the effects of percentage variations in the inaction
thresholds on the number of employed workers at income y. The definition
of these elasticities is similar to the participation elasticities in, e.g., Saez
(2002); the key difference is that in Definition 3 the income thresholds are not
exogenously given as in the case of a binary participation decision, but instead
are endogenously and optimally chosen by the individual.
4.2 Marginal social welfare weights
The social welfare effects of taxation can be characterized using the notion of
marginal social welfare weights.29 In the standard frictionless static model with
a utilitarian social objective, the social weight at income y is defined as the
individual’s marginal utility of consumption normalized by the shadow value of
public funds, λ−1c−γ0 ,30 and represents intuitively the increase in social welfare,
expressed in terms of public revenue, of distributing an additional unit of
consumption uniformly among individuals who earn income y. In this section
I define formally and generalize to the dynamic and frictional environment the
relevant notions of marginal social welfare weights.
29See, e.g., Saez and Stantcheva (2016) for a recent general exposition.
30Note that these marginal social welfare weights are endogenous.
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First consider, in the frictionless model, the effect of giving an additional
marginal consumption stream {cˆt}t≥0 to an individual with current income
y, where cˆt evolves stochastically according to the same process (13) as the
frictionless disposable income c∗t . The frictionless social weight ω∗ (y) is defined
as the change in the individual’s value function (and hence, in utilitarian social
welfare) due to this additional consumption stream:
ω∗ (y) ≡ 1
λ∗
d
dcˆ0
E0
[ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tu
(
c∗t + cˆt −
(h∗t )
1+1/ε
1 + 1/ε
)
dt
∣∣∣y0 = y]
∣∣∣∣∣
cˆ0=0
,
(33)
where λ∗ is the marginal value of public funds in the frictionless model. A
closed-form expression for ω∗ (y) is derived in the Appendix.
Now, in the frictional model, giving individuals with income y the addi-
tional marginal consumption stream {cˆt}t≥0 defined above has different welfare
effects depending on their deviations δ (i.e., their wage-hours bundles) and em-
ployment states x ∈ {i, s}. Since the income tax system treats all individuals
with the same income identically, we define the average social weight at income
y, ω (y), as follows:
Definition 4. The static intensive margin social weight ω (y) is defined as
ω (y) =
λ∗
λ
ω∗ (y)×
ˆ ∞
−∞
v¯ (y, δ) fδ|y (δ |y ) dδ, (34)
where ω∗ (y) is the corresponding frictionless welfare weight defined in equation
(33), v¯ (y, δ) is the average (over employment states x) welfare of individuals
with income and deviation (y, δ), defined formally in equation (43), fδ|y =
f iδ|y + f
s
δ|y is the total density of deviations conditional on an actual income y,
and λ is the marginal value of public funds in the frictional model.
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Second, we saw that a permanent change in progressivity affects the drift
and volatility of the consumption process, and hence the discount rate ρ used
to compute welfare. I thus define the dynamic intensive margin social weight
ωˆ (y) as the welfare effect of a percentage decrease in ρ. In the frictionless
model, this is given by
ωˆ∗ (y) = − 1
λ∗
∂V∗ (y)
∂ lnρ
, (35)
for which a closed-form expression is given in the Appendix. Similarly, in the
frictional model I define:
Definition 5. The dynamic intensive margin social weight ωˆ (y) is defined as
ωˆ (y) =
λ∗
λ
ωˆ∗ (y)×
ˆ ∞
−∞
v¯ (y, δ) fδ|y (δ |y ) dδ. (36)
Third, I define the extensive margin social weights Ω (y), Ω∗ (y), Ω¯ (y) as
the effects of changes in the thresholds δ, δ∗, δ¯ on total welfare at the income
level y:
Definition 6. Let {δi}1≤i≤3 ≡
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
. The extensive margin social weights
{Ωi (y)}1≤i≤3 =
{
Ω (y) ,Ω∗ (y) , Ω¯ (y)
}
are defined as
Ωi (y) ≡1
λ
ˆ ∞
−∞
∂ ln fy,δ (y, δ)
∂ ln |δi| V¯ (y, δ) fδ|y (δ |y ) dδ, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3} , (37)
where V¯ (y, δ) is defined in equation (43).
Finally, the equilibrium composition of each income group y, summarized
by the value functions v¯ (y, δ), is endogenously affected by progressivity, which
in turn has an effect on social welfare. I thus define the composition margin
social weight Ω˜ (y) as:
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Definition 7. The composition margin social weight Ω˜ (y) is defined as
Ω˜ (y) ≡1
λ
ˆ ∞
−∞
(
∂ ln v¯ (y, δ)
∂p
+
∂ ln v¯ (y, δ)
∂ ln y
∂ ln y
∂p
)
V¯ (y, δ) fδ|y (δ |y ) dδ,
(38)
where ∂ ln y
∂p
is given by (10). In particular, when q =∞, Ω˜ is simply equal to
1
λ
∂E[v¯(δ)|y ]
∂p
V∗ (y), that is, the effect of progressivity on the average welfare at
income y.
4.3 Tax reforms and optimal tax schedule
In this section I derive the first-order social welfare effects of two “local tax
reforms” of a given baseline (potentially suboptimal) tax system T : an (in-
finitesimal) perturbation of the parameter τ by dτ , and a perturbation of the
progressivity p by dp. In the former case, this implies that the tax liabil-
ity at income y, T (y) = 1−τ
1−py
1−p, is replaced by the perturbed tax liability
T (y) + Ψτ (y) dτ , and in the latter case by T (y) + Ψp (y) dp, where for all
y ∈ R+,
Ψτ (y) =
y1−p´∞
0
x1−pfy (x) dx
, and Ψp (y) =
(
ln y − 1
1−p
)
y1−p
´∞
0
(
lnx− 1
1−p
)
x1−pfy (x) dx
,
where fy (x) denotes the stationary density of incomes given the baseline tax
schedule (τ, p). The denominators of these expressions are simply a normal-
ization ensuring that in the absence of any behavioral responses (i.e., if all
individuals earned the same taxable income before and after the tax reform),
the total (“statutory”) additional tax revenue collected would be 1 (in monetary
units, say dollars).
I denote the corresponding first-order social welfare changes by Γτ and Γp,
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defined as
Γτ = lim
dτ→0
W (T + Ψτdτ)−W (T )
dτ
, and Γp = lim
dp→0
dW (T + Ψpdp)−W (T )
dp
,
where W (T ) denotes the social welfare when the tax schedule is T (see (7)).
Formally, this is the Gateaux derivative of social welfare with respect to the tax
reforms Ψτ and Ψp, or simply the derivatives dW /dτ and dW /dp, normalized
as explained above.31 The optimal tax schedule (τ ∗, p∗) is then characterized
by imposing that the first-order welfare effects Γτ and Γp are equal to zero.
The following proposition characterizes the welfare effects of the perturba-
tion Ψτ .
Proposition 6. The first-order social welfare effects of uniformly perturbing
the marginal tax rates of any baseline tax schedule T are given by:32
Γτ = 1−
ˆ ∞
0
T ′ (y)
yε∗ (y)
1− T ′ (y)Ψ
′
τ (y) fy (y) dy −
ˆ ∞
0
ω (y) Ψτ (y) fy (y) dy.
(39)
In particular, the optimal tax schedule (τ ∗, p∗) satisfies Γτ = 0. In the fric-
tionless model, the same equation holds, except that the marginal social welfare
weights ω (y) are replaced by their frictionless counterparts ω∗ (y).
Proof. See Appendix.
The interpretation of equation (39) is as follows. The first and second terms
on the right hand side measure the actual change in government tax revenue
31See details in Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2013).
32This equation can be thought of as pinning down the marginal value of public funds
λ given a tax schedule (τ, p). Intuitively, λ (the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
constraint (8)) is equal to the social value of redistributing a dollar of tax revenue through
an decrease in τ by dτ , i.e., through a uniform increase in the net of tax rates (taking into
account the behavioral responses that this perturbation induces).
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of a one-dollar statutory increase in taxes through a uniform perturbation of
the marginal tax rates, taking into account the induced change in individual
behavior. The additional tax liability levied at the income level y after the tax
reform is implemented is given, to a first order in dτ → 0, by Ψτ (y) dτ , and the
marginal tax rate changes by Ψ′τ (y) dτ . The first term in the right hand side
of (39) is the mechanical effect of the perturbation, i.e., the statutory increase
in government revenue absent behavioral responses. It is equal to one (dollar)
by construction of the normalization of the magnitude of the perturbation
Ψτ . The second term in the right hand side of equation (39) is the behavioral
effect of the perturbation. The increase dT ′ ≡ Ψ′τ (y) dτ in the marginal
tax rate of an individual with income y induces her to decrease her taxable
income by y
1−T ′(y)ε
∗ (y) dT ′. This behavioral income response generates a loss
in government revenue proportional to the marginal tax rate T ′ (y). Summing
over individuals using the density of incomes fy (·) yields the total revenue
loss, i.e. the second term in (39). Finally, the third term in (39) is the welfare
effect of the perturbation, expressed in monetary units. An increase in the
tax liability of individual y by dT ≡ Ψτ (y) dτ directly reduces her utility and
hence social welfare by ω (y) × dT , by construction of the marginal social
welfare weights (33).
This equation (39) has a structure that is identical to the “sufficient statis-
tic” formulas derived by, e.g., Saez (2001), Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werquin
(2013), Hendren (2014, 2015), Jacquet and Lehmann (2015), to characterize
the optimal tax systems in frictionless models. Note in particular that all
the variables other than the marginal social welfare weights in equation (39)
(elasticities, tax schedule, income distribution) are empirically observable.33
33Using the formula Γτ = 0 to characterize the optimum tax schedule requires evaluating
these endogenous variables at the optimum. Strictly speaking, the values estimated given
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Proposition 6 extends the neutrality result of Proposition 5. Its main
insight is that the long-run effects on social welfare of a uniform change in
marginal tax rates are the same as we would calculate by assuming that the
economy is frictionless and has a representative agent at each income level y.
In particular, as in Proposition 5, the relevant elasticity is the individual fric-
tionless elasticity ε∗ (y) defined in (29). In short, the frictions at the individual
level wash out in the long-run of the aggregate economy.34
The next proposition characterizes the welfare effects of perturbing the
progressivity p of the tax schedule. It is the main theoretical result of the
paper.
Proposition 7. In the frictionless model, the first-order social welfare effects
of perturbing the progressivity of any baseline tax schedule T are given by:
Γ∗p = 1−
ˆ ∞
0
T ′
y
1− T ′ε
∗Ψ′pdFy −
ˆ ∞
0
[
ω∗Ψp +
d lnρ
dp
ωˆ∗
]
dFy. (40)
In the frictional model, these effects are given by:
Γp = 1−
ˆ ∞
0
T ′
y
1− T ′ε
∗Ψ′pdFy −
ˆ ∞
0
[
ωΨp +
d lnρ
dp
ωˆ
]
dFy +A
+
ˆ ∞
0
T
3∑
i=1
d ln |δi||σδ|
dp
ΞidFy +
ˆ ∞
0
[
3∑
i=1
d ln |δi||σδ|
dp
Ωi + Ω˜
]
dFy,
(41)
where {δi}1≤i≤3 =
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
, {Ξi}1≤i≤3 =
{
Ξ,Ξ∗, Ξ¯
}
, {Ωi}1≤i≤3 =
{
Ω,Ω∗, Ω¯
}
,
the current tax code (in particular, the current U.S. income distribution) can only be used
to quantify the welfare effects of local tax reforms, as explained above.
34There is one difference, however, between the frictionless and the frictional versions of
the optimal tax formula (39): the frictional marginal social welfare weights ω (y) must be
computed by taking into account the non-degenerate distribution of utilities E [v¯ (y, δ) |y ]
within income groups. In general this correction term varies with income y, so that the
schedule of frictional social weights is not perfectly homothetic to the schedule of frictionless
weights, and the effective redistributive tastes of the government have to be adjusted relative
to a model with a representative agent at each income level.
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and A =
d ln
σy
|σδ|
dp
´ (
T ′y − 1
λ
∂V¯
∂ ln y
)
δdFy,δ. In particular, the optimal tax sched-
ule (τ ∗, p∗) is fully characterized by (8), (39), and Γp = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The first result of Proposition 7, equation (40), characterizes the effects of
an increase in progressivity (and in particular, the optimal tax schedule) in
the frictionless model. Its interpretation is identical to that of equation (39),
except that the welfare effect depends in addition on the social weight ωˆ∗ (y).35
It has the same structure as the standard sufficient statistic formulas in static
models.
The second, and most important, result of Proposition 7 is the derivation
of equation (41) which characterizes the long-run welfare effects of raising
progressivity in the frictional model. The first line of this expression is the
same as the frictionless formula (40), replacing the social weights with their
frictional counterparts ω (y) , ωˆ (y) (and with the exception of the unimportant
termA).36 The presence of the second line implies that the frictionless formula
does not correctly account for all of the long-run effects of nonlinear taxes.
The novel effects are: (i) behavioral (revenue) effects driven by the extensive
margin labor income elasticities Ξ (y), Ξ∗ (y), Ξ¯ (y); (ii) welfare effects driven
by the extensive margin social weights Ω (y), Ω∗ (y), Ω¯ (y); and (iii) a welfare
35These social weights are absent from expression (39) and of the optimal tax formulas
derived in standard static models. This highlights the need to properly microfound the
“long-run” as the steady-state of a dynamic economy (rather than simply applying the
static formulas) to capture the full welfare effects of permanent changes in taxes.
36This term appears because because a change in progressivity affects the relative pro-
cesses driving the frictionless income variables {µy, σy,my, sy} (with elasticity d lnσydp ) and
the deviation (or hour) variables
{
µδ, σδ, δ, δ
∗, δ¯
}
(with elasticity d lnσδdp ); this decoupling
affects the long-run density of incomes, see Appendix for details. If the fixed adjustment
cost were on income y rather than hours h (see footnote 15), the volatility of deviations
σδ would always be equal to (minus) that of frictionless incomes σy, and this term would
disappear from the optimal tax formula (41); see the earlier version of this paper (Werquin
(2014)). Moreover, this term has negligible magnitude in practice; see Section 5.
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effect driven by the composition margin social weight Ω˜ (y).37 The extensive
margin terms arise because of the endogenous lumpiness of labor supply, and
the composition term arises because of the endogenous heterogeneity within
income groups.38
Importantly, the extensive margin elasticities Ξi (y) and social weights
Ωi (y) in (41) are multiplied by the terms
(
d ln|δi|
dp
− d ln|σδ|
dp
)
. This means that
the standard frictionless optimal tax formula (40) amounts to implicitly mak-
ing an (implausibly strong) assumption on behavior: namely, that raising the
progressivity of tax schedule shrinks the inaction region, i.e. lowers the option
value of waiting to adjust labor supply, by the same amount as it reduces the
volatility of income shocks. If this does not hold, then the frictionless optimal
tax formula miscalculates the welfare effects of the extensive margin nature of
labor supply adjustments.39 This condition is satisfied in the case of a uniform
change in marginal tax rates, because τ affects neither the volatility nor the
optimal inaction region; this explains the neutrality results of Propositions 5
and 6. In general, however, this condition is violated: the non-linearity of the
policy instrument (here, the progressivity of the tax schedule) interacts with
37Note that while the intensive margin elasticities are multiplied by the marginal tax rate
T ′ (y) to obtain the behavioral (revenue) effect of the tax change, because an infinitesimal
change in income dy reduces tax revenue by T ′ (y) dy, the three extensive margin terms
(corresponding to the three variables δ, δ∗, δ¯ of discrete adjustment), on the other hand, are
multiplied by the average tax rate T (y).
38This is a stronger result than those in the literature that analyzes optimal policy in
static models with an extensive margin or fixed costs (e.g., Saez (2002), Chetty, Looney, and
Kroft (2009), Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011)). In these models a fraction of
the population finds it optimal to adjust their labor supply in response to the tax change,
while the rest of the population doesn’t. This is occuring in my dynamic model only in
the short-run: eventually individuals will all optimally adjust their behavior to the new tax
code as their characteristics evolve over time.
39The frictionless tax formula would also be correct if the effects of locally varying the
thresholds of the inaction region had a second-order effect on the density of incomes and
deviations at each income level, so that the extensive margin elasticitiesΞi and social weights
Ωi would be equal to zero. I do not have a sharp theoretical result proving that this is not
the case, but it does not seem to be happening numerically.
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the lumpiness of individual behavior to generate long-term real effects of tax
changes.
We can already anticipate the direction of these effects. In general, the nar-
rowing of the inaction region due to a higher progressivity is vastly dominated
by the decrease in the volatility of incomes. Intuitively, taxes hardly affect the
tolerance of individuals for deviations of their labor supply away from their op-
timum (they will adjust when their hours are 10 percent away, say, from their
optimum, regardless of the progressivity), while progressivity does dampen the
volatility of income fluctuations by a first-order amount. Thus, relative to the
frictionless benchmark where the two effects exactly compensate each other,
raising p is equivalent to a wider dispersion of individual incomes around their
desired values. This in turn adversely affects welfare, so that the extensive
margin effects on welfare Ω,Ω∗, Ω¯ will tend to reduce the gains (or increase
the losses) of raising progressivity. I analyze the quantitative magnitude of the
novel effects of equation (41) in Section 5, and show that this negative effects
on welfare is the dominant force. In particular, the composition effects (com-
ing from the endogeneity to taxes of the average utility within the population
earning income y, which is no longer a representative agent when labor supply
is frictional) play a less important role in practice.
5 Quantitative analysis
In this section I calibrate the model analyzed in the previous sections, and
evaluate quantitatively the welfare effects of raising the progressivity of the
U.S. tax schedule (equation (41)) and the errors made by wrongly assuming a
frictionless economy.
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5.1 Calibration
I calibrate the marginal tax rates and the rate of progressivity (τ, p) of the
tax schedule in the U.S. using the empirical estimates from PSID data of
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014): τ = −3 and p = 0.151.40,41 I
take a coefficient of risk aversion42 γ = 0.9 and a discount rate ρ1 such that
(1 + ρ1 + ρ2)
−1 = 0.95 (see below for the calibration of ρ2). In an environment
closely related to this paper’s model, Chetty (2012) finds a value for the struc-
tural parameter ε = 0.33 from a meta analysis of the elasticities estimated in
the literature.43 I use this value for the baseline calibration and show how the
results are affected when ε = 1.
The Pareto coefficients and the mean and variance of the U.S. income distri-
bution are observable and lead to
(
rρ2y,1, r
ρ2
y,2,my, sy
)
= (−1.9, 1.4, 10.46, 0.43).44
The volatility of idiosyncratic wage risk σ2y in my model corresponds to the vari-
ance of the permanent component of the individual log-income process in the
40This value of p implies that earning twice as high a gross income leads to a 15.1 percent
decrease in the net-of-tax rate.
41These parameters yield a value for total U.S. government revenue R¯ = $2.33tn for a
population of 320m. I keep this value constant throughout the numerical analysis, so that
whenever I vary the progressivity p I adjust τ in order to keep the revenue R¯ unchanged.
42Recall that the theoretical analysis requires γ to be strictly below 1. Even though
allowing for γ > 1 would be more realistic, this assumption is not crucial, since the goal of
this section is to compute optimal tax rates relative to those in the frictionless model. The
optimal progressivity would be higher with a higher risk aversion in the frictionless model,
but here I focus on the difference between the frictionless and the frictional formulas.
43There is substantial controversy in the literature about the value of the observed taxable
income elasticity ε. The micro literature typically finds values lower than 0.3, while the
macro literature and some structural estimates find it to be closer to 1. See Saez, Slemrod,
and Giertz (2012) and Keane and Rogerson (2012) for an overview of the two strands.
44For the Pareto coefficients, see, e.g., Reed (2003), Reed and Jorgensen (2004), Toda
(2012). For the mean my and variance s2y of the density of incomes at birth, I use E [ln y] =
10.3 and V [ln y] = 1. In the frictionless model, we have E [ln y] = my − r−1y,1 − r−1y,2 and
V [ln y] = s2y + r
−2
y,1 + r
−2
y,2.
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literature (e.g., Meghir and Pistaferri (2004, 2011)); I take σ2y = 0.01.45,46 The
parameters
(
µw, σw,mw, sw, r
ρ2
1,w, r
ρ2
2,w
)
and
(
µc, σc,mc, sc, r
ρ2
1,c, r
ρ2
2,c
)
are then ob-
tained from the relationships rρ2y,1 + r
ρ2
y,2 =
2µy
σ2y
and rρ2y,1r
ρ2
y,2 = −2ρ2σ2y , which pin
down the drift µy and the death rate ρ2,47 and equations (13) and (28).
The fixed adjustment cost κ and the arrival rate of costless adjustment
opportunities q are calibrated using the average duration of searching for a
new job (I take ts = q−1 = 1 month) and the average duration of a job, which
I take equal to ti+ts = 5 years. For ε = 0.33 (resp., ε = 1), I obtain κ = 0.0038
(resp., κ = 0.015), which implies that the cost of searching for a new job, κ,
is equal to 1.2 percent (resp., 5.1 percent) of the average total (frictionless)
utility received during the duration of the search, and an individual starts
searching when her hours are approximately |δ| = δ¯ ≈ 9 percent (resp., 20
percent) away from their optimal value and she then adjusts to δ∗ = −0.1
percent below her current optimal value.
5.2 Numerical results
In this section, I compute Γp in formula (41), i.e., the revenue and social
welfare effects, expressed in dollars, of a $1 statutory increase in tax revenue
through an increase in the rate of progressivity in the U.S. economy calibrated
in Section 5.1. The advantage of using a tax reform (around the U.S. tax
code) rather than an optimal tax approach for quantitative purposes is that
the endogenous variables that appear in the formula can all be easily evaluated
45See also Jones and Kim (2014), for an estimate in a frictionless model similar to this
paper and further references to the empirical literature.
46If the analysis were extended to allow for jumps in the wage process, the corresponding
parameters could be calibrated from Guvenen, Song, Ozkan, and Karahan (2015) who find
that the distribution of earnings growth rates is double-Pareto.
47Note that this leads to a negative drift of income µy, but the growth rate µy + 12σ
2
y is
positive.
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empirically given the actual U.S. data, without the need to extrapolate their
values at the optimum tax schedule.48
The extensive margin elasticities
(
d ln|δ|
dp
− d ln|σδ|
dp
){
Ξ (y) , Ξ¯ (y)
}
are plot-
ted in Figure 6 in the Appendix for ε = 0.33 (left panel) and ε = 1 (right
panel). Figure 7 plots the revenue effects of the tax reform disaggregated by
income for ε = 0.33 and ε = 1 in the frictionless and the frictional models,
that is, −T ′ yε∗
1−T ′Ψ
′
p+T
∑3
i=1
d ln|δi|/|σδ|
dp
Ξi. The elasticities Ξi are non-negligible
(of the order of 0.1 to 0.3 in absolute value). However the revenue effects are
nearly identical in the frictionless and the frictional models at every income
level. This is because the extensive margin elasticities are bounded, while the
increase in progressivity induces an unbounded increase in marginal tax rates
Ψ′p and hence an unbounded intensive margin effect.
Figure 8 plots the welfare effects of increasing progressivity disaggregated
by income for ε = 0.33 and ε = 1, that is, −
[
ωΨp +
d lnρ
dp
ωˆ
]
+
∑3
i=1
d ln|δi|/|σδ|
dp
Ωi+
Ω˜. These effects are large for the smaller value of the labor income elasticity
ε = 0.33, and almost zero for the larger value ε = 1. The composition effects
(captured by the welfare weight Ω˜) play little role in the discrepancy between
the two curves in the left panel. Instead, the extensive margin effects on wel-
fare tend to reduce the gains of raising progressivity, as explained in Section 4.
Thus, ignoring the stickiness in the labor supply decisions of individuals leads
to substantially mis-estimating the welfare costs of raising the progressivity of
the tax schedule. These effects disappear as the labor income elasticity gets
higher, in which case the standard intensive margin welfare effects dominate
the extensive margin effects.
I finally sum these welfare effects over the whole population to obtain the
48This is strictly speaking what the “sufficient statistic” approach of Chetty (2009) allows
us to do.
41
full right hand side of (41). For ε = 0.33, in the frictionless model the total
behavioral (revenue) loss of a $1 statutory increase in p is c11.10, and the
total welfare loss is c83.12.49 The frictional effect of perturbing progressivity
on revenue is 2.25 percent away from this frictionless effect (the behavioral
loss is c0.25 higher), and the frictional effect on welfare is 7.3 percent away
from the frictionless effect (the welfare loss is $6.05 higher), which is a sizeable
error. In contrast, when ε = 1, the total behavioral revenue response of an
increase in p is c33.44, and the total welfare loss is c66.80,50 and the frictional
effects of perturbing progressivity are 0.46 percent and 0.75 percent away from
the frictionless effects on revenue and welfare, respectively; the static model’s
calculations are very accurate in this case.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects on nonlinear income taxation in a model where
individual labor supply is subject to fixed adjustment costs. Several long-
run effects arise, captured by novel elasticities and marginal social welfare
weights. This paper can be seen as a generalization of the optimal taxation
models studied by, e.g., Saez (2002) and Jacquet, Lehmann, and Van der
Linden (2013), who derive optimal tax formulas in static models with a 0-1
decision whether to participate in the labor force. Here, I derive a tax formula
where the extensive margins of adjustment arise endogenously and optimally
conditional on participation because of the fixed cost of adjusting labor supply,
49Note that the sum of the two is lower than the mechanical effect $1, implying that the
U.S. tax code is not progressive enough for the parameters of the calibration. The optimum
rate of progressivity is increasing the risk aversion γ and decreasing in the elasticity ε.
50Note that the sum of the two is slightly larger than the mechanical effect $1, implying
that the U.S. tax code is slightly too progressive for this higher value of the labor income
elasticity.
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consistent with a large body of empirical evidence. I show that the nonlinearity
of the policy instruments interacts with the lumpiness of individual behavior
to yield long-run real effects on social welfare, an insight that can be applied
more generally to other settings than income taxation.
The results of this paper rely on several simplifying assumptions that al-
low the model to be analytically tractable (e.g., specific utility function, wage
process, tax schedule, fixed cost proportional to utility, no savings and bor-
rowings). Most of these assumptions were made to allow for a reduction in
the dimensionality of the state space, leading to a sharp characterization of
individual behavior (Proposition 2 and Figure 1).
On the theoretical side, it should be possible to substantially generalize
the results of this paper by directly postulating a given shape (not necessarily
a cone) for the individual inaction region. This would allow in particular
an analysis of the effects of general non-linear income tax schedules. Note
that a mechanism design approach would in addition allow taxes to depend
on the time at which the individual adjusted her income, and the size of
the corresponding jump (for instance, if productivity has a drift, this would
give information about how far a given individual is from its optimum labor
supply).
On the quantative side, it would be valuable to estimate numerically the
novel effects highlighted theoretically in this paper in a more sophisticated
structural model, allowing for, e.g., savings and borrowings, life-cycle labor
supply decisions, non-proportional fixed adjustment costs, transitory as well
as permanent wage shocks, more general non-linear taxes and transfer pro-
grams, and other dimensions of labor supply adjustment choices (e.g., job
satisfaction). Such a model would also provide realistic estimates of the speed
of adjustment of the economy in response to tax changes, and hence allow
43
us to infer the long-run elasticities from the empirically observed short-run
elasticities in the presence of sluggish individual adjustments to tax changes.
I leave these investigations for future research.
References
Abel, A. B. (1983): “Tax neutrality in the presence of adjustment costs,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 705–712.
Altonji, J. G. and C. H. Paxson (1988): “Labor Supply Preferences, Hours
Constraints, and Hours-Wage Trade-offs,” Journal of Labor Economics, 6,
254–276.
——— (1992): “Labor Supply, Hours Constraints, and Job Mobility,” The
Journal of Human Resources, 27, 256–278.
Alvarez, F., H. L. Bihan, and F. Lippi (2014): “Small and large price
changes and the propagation of monetary shocks,” Tech. rep., National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
Alvarez, F., K. Borovicková, and R. Shimer (2015): “Decomposing
Duration Dependence in a Stopping Time Model,” University of Chicago
Mimeo.
Alvarez, F. and F. Lippi (2014): “Price setting with menu cost for multi-
product firms,” Econometrica, 82, 89–135.
Alvarez, F. and N. L. Stokey (1998): “Dynamic programming with ho-
mogeneous functions,” Journal of economic theory, 82, 167–189.
44
Auerbach, A. J. (1989): “Tax Reform and Adjustment Costs: The Impact
on Investment and Market Value,” International Economic Review, 939–962.
Auerbach, A. J. and K. Hassett (1992): “Tax policy and business fixed
investment in the United States,” Journal of public Economics, 47, 141–170.
Auerbach, A. J. and J. R. Hines Jr (1987): “Anticipated tax changes and
the timing of investment,” in The effects of taxation on capital accumulation,
University of Chicago Press, 163–200.
Badel, A. and M. Huggett (2015): “The Sufficient Statistic Approach:
Predicting the Top of the Laffer Curve,” FRB St. Louis Working Paper.
Benabou, R. (2002): “Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent
Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?”
Econometrica, 70, 481–517.
Bensoussan, A., J. L. Lions, and J.-L. Lions (1982): Contrôle impul-
sionnel et inéquations quasi variationnelles, vol. 1, Dunod Paris.
Bertola, G. and R. J. Caballero (1990): “Kinked adjustment costs and
aggregate dynamics,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1990, Volume 5,
MIT Press, 237–296.
Bloom, N. (2009): “The impact of uncertainty shocks,” econometrica, 77,
623–685.
Caballero, R. J. and E. M. Engel (1999): “Explaining investment dy-
namics in US manufacturing: a generalized (S, s) approach,” Econometrica,
67, 783–826.
45
Calvo, G. A. (1983): “Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework,”
Journal of monetary Economics, 12, 383–398.
Caplin, A. and J. Leahy (1991): “State-dependent pricing and the dynam-
ics of money and output,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 683–708.
Caplin, A. S. and D. F. Spulber (1987): “Menu Costs and the Neutrality
of Money,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 703–725.
Chetty, R. (2009): “Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis A Bridge
Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods,” Annual Review of Eco-
nomics, 1, 451–488.
——— (2012): “Bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions: A synthesis
of micro and macro evidence on labor supply,” Econometrica, 80, 969–1018.
Chetty, R., J. Friedman, T. Olsen, and L. Pistaferri (2011): “Adjust-
ment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities:
Evidence from Danish Tax Records.” The quarterly journal of economics,
126, 749–804.
Chetty, R., A. Guren, D. Manoli, and A. Weber (2012): “Does in-
divisible labor explain the difference between micro and macro elasticities?
A meta-analysis of extensive margin elasticities,” in NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 2012, Volume 27, University of Chicago Press, 1–56.
Chetty, R., A. Looney, and K. Kroft (2009): “Salience and Taxation:
Theory and Evidence,” American Economic Review, 99, 1145–1177.
Chone, P. and G. Laroque (2010): “Negative marginal tax rates and
heterogeneity,” American Economic Review, 100, 2532–2547.
46
Cogan, J. F. (1981): “Fixed Costs and Labor Supply,” Econometrica, 49,
945–963.
Davis, S. J. and M. Henrekson (2004): “Tax effects on work activity,
industry mix and shadow economy size: Evidence from rich-country com-
parisons,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dickens, W. T. and S. Lundberg (1993): “Hours Restrictions and Labor
Supply,” International Economic Review, 34, 169–92.
Dixit, A. K. (1993): The art of smooth pasting, vol. 55, Taylor & Francis.
Dixit, A. K. and R. S. Pindyck (1994): Investment under uncertainty,
Princeton university press.
Farhi, E. and X. Gabaix (2015): “Optimal taxation with behavioral
agents,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Feng, H. and K. Muthuraman (2010): “A computational method for
stochastic impulse control problems,” Mathematics of Operations Research,
35, 830–850.
Findeisen, S. and D. Sachs (2015): “Education and optimal dynamic tax-
ation: The role of income-contingent student loans,” .
Gabaix, X. (2009): “Power Laws in Economics and Finance,” Annual Review
of Economics, 1, 255–294.
Gabaix, X., J.-M. Lasry, P.-L. Lions, and B. Moll (2015): “The dy-
namics of inequality,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
47
Gelber, A. M., D. Jones, and D. W. Sacks (2013): “Earnings adjust-
ment frictions: Evidence from the social security earnings test,” Tech. rep.,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Golosov, M., A. Tsyvinski, and N. Werquin (2013): “A Variational
Approach to the Analysis of Tax systems,” working paper.
Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz, and G. W. Huffman (1988): “Invest-
ment, Capacity Utilization, and the Real Business Cycle,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 78, 402–17.
Grossman, S. and G. Laroque (1990): “Asset pricing and optimal portfolio
choice in the presence of illiquid durable consumption goods,” Econometrica,
58, 25–52.
Gruber, J. and E. Saez (2002): “The elasticity of taxable income: evidence
and implications,” Journal of public Economics, 84, 1–32.
Guvenen, F., J. Song, S. Ozkan, and F. Karahan (2015): “What do
data on millions of US workers reveal about life-cycle earnings risk?” NBER
Working Paper No. w20913.
Hall, R. E. and D. W. Jorgenson (1967): “Tax policy and investment
behavior,” The American Economic Review, 57, 391–414.
Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, and G. L. Violante (2014): “Opti-
mal tax progressivity: An analytical framework,” Tech. rep., National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
Hendren, N. (2014): “The inequality deflator: Interpersonal comparisons
without a social welfare function,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic
Research.
48
——— (2015): “The Policy Elasticity,” in Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol-
ume 30, University of Chicago Press.
Holmlund, B. and M. Söderström (2008): “Estimating dynamic in-
come responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence,” Tech. rep., Working
paper//IFAU-Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation.
Jacquet, L. and E. Lehmann (2015): “Optimal Income Taxation when
Skills and Behavioral Elasticites are Heterogeneous,” .
Jacquet, L., E. Lehmann, and B. Van der Linden (2013): “Optimal
redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 148, 1770–1805.
Jones, C. I. and J. Kim (2014): “A schumpeterian model of top income
inequality,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Keane, M. and R. Rogerson (2012): “Micro and macro labor supply elas-
ticities: A reassessment of conventional wisdom,” Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, 464–476.
Krueger, D., F. Perri, L. Pistaferri, and G. L. Violante (2010):
“Cross-sectional facts for macroeconomists,” Review of Economic Dynamics,
13, 1–14.
Ljungqvist, L. and T. J. Sargent (2011): “A Labor Supply Elasticity
Accord?” The American Economic Review, 101, 487–491.
Meghir, C. and L. Pistaferri (2004): “Income variance dynamics and
heterogeneity,” Econometrica, 72, 1–32.
49
——— (2011): “Earnings, consumption and life cycle choices,” Handbook of
Labor Economics, 4, 773–854.
Musgrave, R. A. and T. Thin (1948): “Income tax progression, 1929-48,”
The Journal of Political Economy, 498–514.
Nirei, M. and W. Souma (2007): “A two factor model of income distribution
dynamics,” Review of Income and Wealth, 53, 440–459.
Øksendal, B. K. and A. Sulem (2005): Applied stochastic control of jump
diffusions, vol. 498, Springer.
Reed, W. J. (2003): “The Pareto law of incomes: an explanation and an
extension,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 319, 469–
486.
Reed, W. J. and M. Jorgensen (2004): “The double Pareto-lognormal dis-
tribution: a new parametric model for size distributions,” Communications
in Statistics-Theory and Methods, 33, 1733–1753.
Richard, S. F. (1977): “Optimal impulse control of a diffusion process with
both fixed and proportional costs of control,” SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 15, 79–91.
Rogerson, R. (1988): “Indivisible labor, lotteries and equilibrium,” Journal
of monetary Economics, 21, 3–16.
Rogerson, R. and J. Wallenius (2009): “Micro and macro elasticities in
a life cycle model with taxes,” Journal of Economic theory, 144, 2277–2292.
Saez, E. (2001): “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates,”
Review of Economic Studies, 68, 205–229.
50
——— (2002): “Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Ex-
tensive Labor Supply Responses*,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117,
1039–1073.
Saez, E., J. Slemrod, and S. H. Giertz (2012): “The elasticity of taxable
income with respect to marginal tax rates: A critical review,” Journal of
Economic Literature, 3–50.
Saez, E. and S. Stantcheva (2016): “Generalized Social Marginal Welfare
Weights for Optimal Tax Theory,” American Economic Review, 106, 24–45.
Shourideh, A. and M. Troshkin (2009): “Designing Optimal Pension
Systems,” working paper.
Stantcheva, S. (2015): “Optimal taxation and human capital policies over
the life cycle,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Stokey, N. L. (2008): The Economics of Inaction: Stochastic Control models
with fixed costs, Princeton University Press.
Summers, L. H. (1981): “Taxation and Corporate Investment: A q-Theory
Approach,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1981, 67–140.
Toda, A. A. (2012): “The double power law in income distribution: Expla-
nations and evidence,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84,
364–381.
Vavra, J. (2014): “Inflation Dynamics and Time-Varying Volatility: New
Evidence and an Ss Interpretation*.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129.
Werquin, N. (2014): “Income taxation with frictional labor supply,” Working
paper, Dept of Economics Yale University.
51
Income Taxation with Frictional Labor Supply
Online Appendix
Nicolas Werquin
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs and additional results for Sections 1 to 3
Tax system
The tax schedule (3), calibrated to the U.S. tax code, has a rate a progressivity equal to p = 0.151.
This means that the net-of-tax rate decreases by 15% when gross income doubles. Figure 1.(a)
in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) fits this tax function to the U.S. tax-and-transfer
system using PSID data and finds an extremely good fit (R2 = 0.96). Figure 2 shows this tax
schedule for p = 0.151 and p = 0.156. The right panel zooms in at the bottom of the income
distribution, where marginal and average tax rates are negative.
Figure 2: Tax and transfer schedule
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Individual behavior and welfare: frictionless model
I first derive the properties of individual welfare in the frictionless model. I show the second equality
in equation (5), i.e., that the average expected frictionless utility during the search period (and hence
the fixed cost κ) is proportional to the instantaneous utility of frictionless consumption. I also
compute the value function in the frictionless model, i.e., equation (15), which is also proportional
to the current utility of consumption. I finally derive the marginal social welfare weights (33).
Proof of equations (5), (15), and (33). The expected frictionless utility from time 0 to the
32
random time τˆ ∼ E (q) is then equal to
κ =κ˜× E0
ˆ τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)t
1
1− γ
(
c∗t −
1
1 + 1/ε
(
y∗t
wt
)1+1/ε)1−γ
dt

=κ˜
(
1 + pε
1 + ε
)1−γ
E0
[ˆ τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tg (c∗t ) dt
]
,
where the equality follows from the first-order conditions (9). Moreover, equation (13) shows that
c∗ follows a geometric Brownian motion, which implies
dg (c∗t ) =
[
(1− γ)µc + 1
2
(1− γ)2 σ2c
]
g (c∗t ) dt+ [(1− γ)σc] g (c∗t ) dWt,
and hence g (c∗t ) = g (c∗0) e(1−γ)µct+(1−γ)σcWt . Using the facts that Wt ∼ N (0, t) and E
[
eX
]
=
eµ+σ
2/2 if X ∼ N (µ, σ2), we thus obtain
κ =κ˜
(
1 + pε
1 + ε
)1−γ
g (c∗0)E0
[ˆ τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc−
1
2
(1−γ)2σ2c)t
]
=κ˜
(
1 + pε
1 + ε
)1−γ
g (c∗0)
ˆ ∞
0
qe−qτˆ
ˆ τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc−
1
2
(1−γ)2σ2c)tdτˆ
=
κ˜
(
1+pε
1+ε
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 + q − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
g (c∗0) ,
which proves equation (5).
Similarly, the individual frictionless value function is given by
V∗ (y) = E
ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)t
1
1− γ
(
c∗t −
1
1 + 1/ε
(
y∗t
wt
)1+1/ε)1−γ
dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ y = y∗ (w0)

=
(
1+pε
1+ε
)1−γ
1− γ E0
[ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)t (c∗t )
1−γ dt
]
=
(
1+pε
1+ε c
∗
0
)1−γ
1− γ
ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc−
1
2
(1−γ)2σ2c)t,
from which equation (15) follows.
Finally, let cˆt follow the same geometric Brownian motion process as c∗t (equation (13)), which
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implies that 1+pε1+ε c
∗
t + cˆt also follows the same process. The same steps as above imply
ω∗ (y) =
1
λ∗
d
dcˆ0
(
E0
[ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tu
(
c∗t + cˆt −
1
1 + 1/ε
(h∗t )
1+1/ε
)
dt
∣∣∣∣ y0 = y])
cˆ0=0
=
1
λ∗
d
dcˆ0
 11−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε c
∗
0 + cˆ0
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c

cˆ0=0
=
1
λ∗
(
1+pε
1+ε
)−γ (
1−τ
1−p
)−γ
y−γ(1−p)
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
,
which gives a closed-form expression for the static marginal social welfare weights in the frictionless
setting. Moreover,
ωˆ∗ (y) = − 1
λ∗
∂V∗ (y)
∂ lnρ
=
1
λ∗
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
,
which gives a closed-form expression for the dynamic marginal social welfare weights in the friction-
less setting.
Individual behavior and welfare: frictional model
I now derive the properties of individual welfare in the frictional model. I show the homogeneity of
the utility function and the value functions Vx (y∗, δ) (Proposition 1), and define the value functions
Vˆx (y, δ) (i.e., the welfare of individuals with actual, rather than frictionless, income y, deviation δ,
and employment state x) and V¯ (y, δ) (i.e., the average welfare of individuals with actual income y
and deviation δ).
Proof of Proposition 1. Substituting y∗ for w using the optimality condition (9) into the flow
utility U
(
y − T (y) , yw
)
yields
U =
1
1− γ
[
1− τ
1− p (y
∗)1−p
]1−γ
×
[(
y
y∗
)1−p
− 1− p
1 + 1/ε
(
y
y∗
)1+1/ε]1−γ
=
1
1− γ
[
1− τ
1− p (y
∗)1−p
]1−γ [
e(1−p)δ − 1− p
1 + 1/ε
e(1+
1
ε)δ
]1−γ
≡ g (c∗)× u (δ) ,
which implies that the flow utility U (y∗, δ) is homogeneous in the utility of frictionless dispos-
able income c∗. A second-order Taylor approximation of the function u (δ) around the frictionless
optimum δ = 0 shows that the utility loss from failing to optimize is locally quadratic,
u (δ) ∼
δ→0
(
1 + pε
1 + ε
)1−γ [
1− 1
2
(1− γ) (1− p)
(
1 +
1
ε
)
δ2
]
.
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The value function Vi (y∗, δ) of inactive individuals is equal to
Vi (y∗0, δ0) = maxτ1 E0
[ˆ τ1
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tg
(
1− τ
1− py
∗1−p
t
)
u (δt) dt+ e
−(ρ1+ρ2)τ1 {Vs (y∗τ1 , δτ1)− κτ1}] ,
subject to the laws of motion (12) and (17), where τ1 is the optimal stopping time at which the
individual starts searching by paying the fixed cost. The value function Vs (y∗, δ) of searchers is
equal to
Vs (y∗0, δ0) = max
δ∗τˆ
E0
[ˆ τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tU (y∗t , δt) dt+ e
−(ρ1+ρ2)τˆVi
(
y∗τˆ, δ
∗
τˆ
)]
,
subject to the laws of motion (12) and (17), where τˆ is a stopping time with an exponential distribu-
tion with parameter q, and δ∗τˆ is the optimal deviation that the individual chooses upon reception of
an adjustment opportunity at time τˆ. From these equations we can write a sequential formulation
of the value functions Vi and Vs and obtain that Vx(y
∗,δ)
g
(
1−τ
1−p y
∗1−p
) = vx (δ) for x ∈ {i, s}, where
vi (δ0) = maxτ1
E0
[ˆ τ1
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)t+(1−γ)σcWtu (δt) dt
+e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)τ1+(1−γ)σcWτ1 {vs (δτ1)− κ}
]
vs (δ0) = max
δ∗τˆ
E0
[ˆ τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)t+(1−γ)σcWtu (δt) dt
+e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)τˆ+(1−γ)σcWτˆvi
(
δ∗τˆ
)]
.
(42)
Proposition 1 follows.
These results imply that the value functions Vˆx (y, δ) (for an actual income y) are equal to
Vˆx (y, δ) = V∗ (y)× vˆx (δ), where the value functions vˆi (δ) , vˆs (δ) are given by
vˆx (δ) = ρ
(
1 + pε
1 + ε
)γ−1
e−(1−p)(1−γ)δvx (δ) ,
for x ∈ {i, s}. I finally denote by V¯ (y, δ) and v¯ (y, δ) the the value functions averaged over the
employment state (inactive and searching), that is,
v¯ (y, δ) = v¯i (δ)
f iy,δ (y, δ)
f iy,δ (y, δ) + f
s
y,δ (y, δ)
+ v¯s (δ)
fsy,δ (y, δ)
f iy,δ (y, δ) + f
s
y,δ (y, δ)
, and V¯ (y, δ) = V∗ (y) v¯ (y, δ) ,
(43)
where f iy,δ, f
s
y,δ denote the stationary joint densities of inactive and searching individuals at income
and deviation (y, δ).
Next, I characterize the solution to the individual’s impulse control problem (Proposition 2). As
a first step, I calculate explicitly the value of searching vs.
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Closed-form expression for (23). I show that
vˆs (δ) ≡E0
[ˆ τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tU (y∗t , δt) dt |δ0 = δ
]
=
´∞
−∞
[
er
ρ1+ρ2+q
2,δ xI{x≤0} + e
r
ρ1+ρ2+q
1,δ xI{x>0}
]
u (x+ δ) dx
σ2δ
2 e
(1−γ)(1+ 1ε)
(
rρ1+ρ2+q2,δ − rρ1+ρ2+q1,δ
) , (44)
where rρ1,x, r
ρ
2,x are defined in (26). We have, letting τˆ ∼ E (q),
E0
[ˆ τˆ
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tg (c∗t )u (δt) dt+ e
−(ρ1+ρ2)τˆg
(
c∗τˆ
)
vi (δ
∗)
]
=g (c∗0)
ˆ ∞
0
qe−qtE0
[ˆ t
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)s+(1−γ)σcWsu (δs) ds
+ e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)t+(1−γ)σcWtvi (δ∗)
]
dt.
Using Fubini’s theorem, the fact that Wt ∼ N (0, t), and the quadratic approximation u (δ) = α0 +
α1δ+α2δ
2, we obtain that the stochastic integral (for fixed t) is equal to, with δs = δ0 +µδs+σδWs:
E0
[ˆ t
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)se(1−γ)σcWsu (δs) ds
]
=
1
ρ3
α2 ((1− γ)σcσδ + µδ)2
(
2− e−ρt (ρ2t2 + 2ρt+ 2))+ 1
ρ
(
α0 + α1δ0 + α2δ
2
0
) (
1− e−ρt)
+
1
ρ2
(
α1 (µδ + (1− γ)σcσδ) + α2σ2δ + 2α2 (µδ + (1− γ)σcσδ) δ0
) (
1− e−ρt (ρt+ 1)) .
Integrating over the stopping time t then yields:
ˆ ∞
0
qe−qtE0
[ˆ t
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)se(1−γ)σcWsu (δs) ds
]
dt
=
(
α2
ρ+ q
)
δ20 +
(
α1
ρ+ q
+ 2α2
µδ + (1− γ)σcσδ
(ρ+ q)2
)
δ0
+
(
α0
ρ+ q
+ α1
(µδ + (1− γ)σcσδ)
(ρ+ q)2
+ α2
2 (µδ + (1− γ)σcσδ)2 + (ρ+ q)σ2δ
(ρ+ q)3
)
.
Straightforward algebra finally shows that the right hand side of (44) is equal to this expression.
(Formula 44 is obtained by solving directly the HJB equation for searchers with the relevant bound-
ary conditions at ±∞.) Finally the value of returning to δ∗ (assuming that the optimal impulse
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control policy is the
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
-policy, see below) is given by
E
[
e−(ρ1+ρ2)τˆVi
(
y∗τˆ, δ
∗
τˆ
)]
=
ˆ ∞
0
qe−qtE0
[
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)t+(1−γ)σcWtvi (δ∗)
]
dt =
qvi (δ
∗)
ρ1 + ρ2 + q − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
,
which is the second term of equation (23).
I now define the operators L,M : C2 (R)→ C0 (R) by
Lv (δ) = [µδ + (1− γ)σcσδ] v′ (δ) + 1
2
σ2δv
′′ (δ) ,
Mv (δ) = q
ρ+ q
sup
δ′∈R
v
(
δ′
)
+ vˆs (δ)− κ.
The following Verification Lemma provides sufficient conditions for optimality and characterizes the
optimal policy.
Lemma 1. Suppose we can find a function v : R→ R that satisfies:
v ∈ C1 (R) ∩ C2 (R \ D) , where D = {δ ∈ R : v (δ) >Mv (δ)} , (45)
Lv (δ) + u (δ) ≤ ρv (δ) , ∀δ ∈ R \ ∂D, with equality in D, (46)
Mv (δ) ≤ v (δ) , ∀δ ∈ R. (47)
Suppose moreover that v has locally bounded derivatives near ∂D and for all τ ∈ T , p ∈ P, δ0 ∈ R,
E
[
e−(ρ1+ρ2)τ
∣∣v (δpτ)∣∣+ ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)t
∣∣Lv (δpt )∣∣ dt] <∞. (48)
Then v (δ) = vi (δ) andMv (δ) = vs (δ) for all δ ∈ R, where vi and vs are the value functions (42).
Moreover, if {v(δp∗τ ) : τ ∈ T } is uniformly integrable the optimal impulse control policy p∗ ∈ P is
given by: for all j ≥ 1,
τ∗j = inf
{
t > τ∗j−1 + τˆj−1 : δ
p∗j−1
t /∈ D
}
, and ∆∗j = sup
δ′∈R
v
(
δ′
)− v(δp∗j−1
τ∗j+τˆ
−
j
)
,
where δ
p∗j−1
t is the process resulting from applying p∗j =
(
τ∗1, . . . , τ∗j−1,∆
∗
1 (τˆ1) , . . . ,∆
∗
j−1 (τˆj−1)
)
to δ.
Proof. Fix an impulse control policy p =
(
{τj ,∆j (τˆj)}j≥1
)
∈ P. By condition (i) and Theorem
2.1. in Øksendal and Sulem (2005), we can assume that v ∈ C2 (R). Hence using condition (iv) we
can apply the localized version of Dynkin’s formula (Theorem 1.24. in Øksendal and Sulem (2005)
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modified to take into account the discounting) to get, for j ≥ 0,
E
[
e−(ρ1+ρ2)(τj+τˆj)g
(
c∗τj+τˆj
)
v
(
δτj+τˆj
)]
− E
[
e−(ρ1+ρ2)τj+1g
(
c∗τj+1
)
v
(
δτj+1
)]
=− g (c∗0)E
[ˆ τj+1
τj+τˆj
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)t+(1−γ)σcWt (−ρv (δt) + Lv (δt)) dt
]
≥ g (c∗0)E
[ˆ τj+1
τj+τˆj
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)t+(1−γ)σcWtu (δt) dt
]
,
where the inequality follows from condition (47), and it becomes an equality if p = p∗. Moreover,
we have
E
[
e−(ρ1+ρ2)τj+1g
(
c∗τj+1
)
v
(
δτj+1
)]
− E
[
e−(ρ1+ρ2)(τj+1+τˆj+1)g
(
c∗τj+1+τˆj+1
)
v
(
δτj+1+τˆ−j+1
+ ∆j+1 (τˆj+1)
)]
≥g (c∗0)
{
E
[
e
−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)τj+1+(1−γ)σcWτj+1v
(
δτj+1
)]
− E
[
e
−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)(τj+1+τˆj+1)+(1−γ)σcWτj+1+τˆj+1
]
sup
δ′∈R
v
(
δ′
)}
=g (c∗0)E
[
e
−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)τj+1+(1−γ)σcWτj+1 (v (δτj+1)−Mv (δτj+1)+ vˆs (δτj+1)− κ)]
≥g (c∗0)E
[
e
−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)τj+1+(1−γ)σcWτj+1 (vˆs (δτj+1)− κ)] ,
where the last equality follows from condition (ii). Both inequalities become equalities if p = p∗.
Thus, we obtain, summing the previous equations from j = 0 to j = N ≥ 1,
g (c∗0) v (δ0)− E
[
e−(ρ1+ρ2)(τN+1+τˆN+1)g
(
c∗τN+1+τˆN+1
)
v
(
δτˆN+1
)]
≥g (c∗0)E
[
N∑
j=0
ˆ τj+1
τj+τˆj
e−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)t+(1−γ)σcWtu (δt) dt
+
N∑
j=0
e
−(ρ1+ρ2−(1−γ)µc)τj+1+(1−γ)σcWτj+1 (vˆs (δτj+1)− κ)
]
=E
ˆ τN+1+τˆN+1
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tg (c∗t )u
(
δpt
)
dt−
N∑
j=0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)τj+1κg
(
c∗τj+1
) ,
(with equality if p = p∗), where the equality follows from (44). Now, as N →∞, we have τN →∞
so that the second term on the l.h.s. of the previous equation converges to zero. Therefore we
obtain
V (y∗0, δ0) ≥E
ˆ ∞
0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)tU
(
y∗t , δ
p
t
)
dt−
∞∑
j=0
e−(ρ1+ρ2)τj+1κτj+1
 , ∀p ∈ P ,
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with equality if p = p∗. (We restrict the set P of admissible controls to those p that satisfy
E
[´∞
0 e
−(ρ1+ρ2)t ∣∣u (δpt )∣∣ dt] <∞.) But the right hand side is the lifetime utility of an individual at
birth, after δ0 has been chosen, under the control policy p (see (6)). This concludes the proof.
Condition (47) is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Quasi-Variational Inequality (QVI), (46) is the
value-matching QVI, and (45) is the smooth-pasting property.51 The optimal policy is such that
that the agent remains inactive when the state process δ stays within the continuation region D,
and starts searching (by paying the fixed cost) when it attempts to leave D. By Proposition 1, this
solution coincides with the optimal value functions and control policy if vs satisfies (46) on
(
δ, δ¯
)
,
(47) on R \ (δ, δ¯), and (48). In the case where paying the fixed cost leads to immediate adjustment
(i.e., q =∞), we can verify these conditions directly:
Corollary 1. Let q = ∞, so that vˆs (δ) = 0. Suppose that there exist
(
δ, δ∗, δ¯
)
such that the
function vi : R → R solves the differential equation problem (19), (23), (20), and the conditions
(21) and (22) hold. Suppose finally that v′i (δ) > 0 (resp., v
′
i (δ) < 0) on an interval δ ∈ (δ, δ + ε)
(resp., δ ∈ (δ¯ − ε, δ¯)). Then vi (δ) is the value function of the individual’s problem and the optimal
individual policy is characterized by the control band
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
.
Proof. To prove that the conjectured policy is indeed optimal, we need to show that if the value
function satisfies (19,20,21,22,23), then it satisfies the assumptions of the Verification Proposition 1
and the quasi-variational inequalities (46,47). If q = ∞, then the technical conditions required for
the Verification theorem 1 to hold are simpler (see Richard (1977)): v′ must be absolutely continuous
and bounded and v′′ must be in L2 (R); these are easily verified. It remains to check that the QVI
are satisfied.
First, I show that the lower bound of the conjectured inaction region is non-positive, δ ≤ 0,
and the upper bound is non-negative, δ¯ ≥ 0, so that the argmax of the flow utility u (δ) lies within
the inaction region. Note first that v′′
(
δ+
)
> 0, v′′
(
δ¯−
)
< 0 and v′′ (δ∗) ≤ 0, where the first two
inequalities follow from the continuity of v′ and the assumption that v′ > 0 (resp., v′ < 0) in a
neighborhood to the right of δ (resp. to the left of δ¯). Define the first and the last inflection points
of v on [δ, δ∗] by We know that such values exist in [δ, δ∗], because v′′
(
δ+
)
> 0 and v′ (δ∗) = 0.
Since u, v, v′ ∈ C1 ((δ, δ∗)), the HJB equation (19) implies that v′′ is continuously differentiable.
Taking left derivatives of the HJB and evaluating at δ∗M yields
σ2δ
2
v′′′
(
δ∗−M
)
=ρv′
(
δ∗−M
)− u′ (δ∗−M ) ≥ ρv′ (δ∗)− u′ (δ∗M ) = −u′ (δ∗M ) ,
where the inequality follows from the definition of δ∗M and v
′′ (δ∗) ≤ 0. Since v′′′ (δ∗−M ) ≤ 0, we
obtain −u′ (δ∗M ) ≤ 0. But u is concave with a unique global maximum at δ = 0, hence δ∗M ≤ 0 and
u′ (δ) > u′ (δ∗M ) for all δ < δ
∗
M .
Second, I show that the conjectured value function v is unimodal, that is, v (δ) is strictly
increasing on (δ, δ∗) and strictly decreasing on
(
δ∗, δ¯
)
. If δ∗m = δ∗M , then v
′ (δ) > 0 for all δ ∈ (δ, δ∗).
51See Bensoussan et al. (1982).
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Suppose that δ∗m < δ∗M and there exists δ ∈ (δ, δ∗) such that v′ (δ) ≤ 0. Then there exists δ˜ ∈
(δ∗m, δ∗M ) which is a local minimizer of v
′, with v′
(
δ˜
)
< 0 and v′′′
(
δ˜−
)
≥ 0 . Taking left derivatives
in the HJB equation (19) and evaluating at δ˜ yields:
u′
(
δ˜−
)
=− 1
2
σ2c
(1− p)2 v
′′′
(
δ˜−
)
+ ρv′
(
δ˜−
)
< 0.
But we saw above that u′ (δ∗M ) ≥ 0, which implies u′
(
δ˜
)
> 0 since δ˜ < δ∗M and u is strictly concave
and unimodal, a contradiction.
I now show that the conjectured value function satisfies the QVI (47), i.e., Lv (δ)−ρv (δ)+u (δ) ≤
0 for all δ ∈ R. The HJB equation (19) and a symmetry argument imply that it is sufficient to
check this inequality on (−∞, δ). Fix δ < δ. We have
[Lv (δ)− ρv (δ) + u (δ)]
=
[Lv (δ+)− ρv (δ) + u (δ)]− ρ (v (δ)− v (δ))− [µδ + (1− γ)σcσδ] (v′ (δ)− v′ (δ))
+
1
2
σ2δ
(
v′′ (δ)− v′′ (δ+))+ (u (δ)− u (δ)) .
The HJB equation (19), the value-matching condition (20) and the smooth-pasting conditions (21)
imply that the first line of the right hand side is equal to zero. Moreover, we saw above that
v′′ (δ) = 0 < v′′
(
δ+
)
and u (δ) ≤ u (δ), which concludes the proof.
Finally, I show that the conjectured value function satisfies the QVI (46), i.e.,Mv (δ)−v (δ) ≤ 0
for all δ ∈ R, whereMv (δ) = v (δ∗) − κ. For δ ∈ R \ (δ, δ¯), this QVI is satisfied with equality by
construction. For δ ∈ (δ, δ∗), we saw that v′ (δ) > 0 which implies Mv (δ) < v (δ), and a similar
argument applies for δ ∈ (δ∗, δ¯).
I now provide an intuitive derivation of the QVI of Proposition 1, i.e., of the HJB equation and
the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions.
Heuristic derivation of equations (46) and (47). Suppose that an optimal policy p∗ exists.
If the individual adopts an arbitrary control for an infinitesimal amount of time and then switches
back to the optimal control p∗, then the resulting value function cannot be better than the optimal
one. If the individual is currently inactive, there are only two possible choices of control during that
infinitesimal period: not impose any control (QVI (47)), and pay the fixed cost to begin a search
period (QVI (46)). Finally, one of the two quasi-variational inequalities must hold with equality,
since one of these two choices of control must be optimal.
Consider an inactive individual with frictionless income and deviation (y∗t , δt), who remains
inactive during the time interval [t, t+ ∆t) for some small ∆t > 0, then reverts back to the optimal
policy p∗. Her value function V (y∗t , δt) satisfies
V (y∗t , δt) ≥U (y∗t , δt) ∆t+
1− ρ2∆t
1 + ρ1∆t
Et [V (y∗t + ∆y∗, δt + ∆δ)] ,
40
where ∆δ = − (1−p)ε1+ε ∆ ln y∗. Multiplying by (1 + ρ1∆t), substracting (1− ρ2∆t)V (y∗t , δt) and di-
viding by ∆t on both sides, we obtain, letting ∆t→ 0,
(ρ1 + ρ2)V (y∗, δ) ≥U (y∗, δ) + Et [dV (y
∗, δ)]
dt
.
Using Itô’s formula and the laws of motion of y∗t and δt, we find
Et [dV (y∗t , δt)]
dt
=
(
µy +
1
2
σ2y
)
y∗t
∂V
∂y∗
+ µδ
∂V
∂δ
+
1
2
σ2y (y
∗
t )
2 ∂
2V
∂ (y∗)2
+
1
2
σ2δ
∂2V
∂δ2
+ σyσδy
∗
t
∂2V
∂y∗∂δ
.
Since the value function is homogeneous in g (c∗), we can replace V (y∗t , δt) with g (c∗t ) v (δy) in the
resulting equation and divide through by g (c∗t ) to obtain ρv (δt) ≥ Lv (δt) + u (δt).
Next suppose that the individual pays the fixed adjustment cost at time t, and hence becomes
a searcher. We have
V (y∗t , δt) ≥ Vs (y∗t , δt)− κg (c∗t ) .
Dividing both sides by g (c∗t ) and using the expression derived above for vs (δ), we thus obtain
v (δt) ≥Mv (δt).
We can similarly derive heuristically the smooth-pasting conditions.
The interpretation of the HJB equation (19) is as follows. Interpreting the entitlement to the
flow of disposable incomes and deviations as an asset, and Vs (y∗, δ) as its value, we can write:
(ρ1 + ρ2)Vi (y∗, δ) = U (y∗, δ) + Et [dVi (y
∗, δ)]
dt
.
The left hand side gives the normal return per unit time that an individual, using (ρ1 + ρ2) as the
discount rate, would require for holding this asset. The right hand side is the expected total return
per unit time from holding the asset. The first term is the immediate payout or dividend from the
asset. The second term is its expected rate of capital gain or loss. The equality is a no-arbitrage
condition, expressing the investor’s willingness to hold the asset. Using Itô’s formula, we can express
the second term in the right hand side as a function of the first and second partial derivatives of
the value function Vi and the drifts and volatilities of the income and deviation processes. We
then obtain the HJB equation (19) for vi (δ) using the homogeneity of the value function shown in
Proposition 1.
Feng and Muthuraman (2010) provide an algorithm to compute numerically the optimal indi-
vidual policy solution to (19,20,20,22), which is easily extended to this paper’s environment.
Figure 3 shows the value functions vi (δ) and vs (δ) of inactives (in blue) and searchers (in red)
along with the optimal thresholds δ, δ∗, δ¯, as well as the function vs (δ) − κ (dashed red), which
illustrates the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions.
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Figure 3: Value functions vi (δ) , vs (δ)
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Figure 4 shows graphically the value functions vˆi (δ) , vˆs (δ) conditional on (actual) income y (left
panel) and the effects of perturbing the progressivity of the tax schedule on the optimal inaction
region and on the value of inactives vˆi (right panel). These figures show that (both inactive and
searching) individuals with higher deviation but the same income are worse off (i.e., individuals who
work more hours but earn the same income, and hence have a lower wage, reach a lower level of
utility), and that within the inaction region the value of searching is always strictly higher than the
value of inactivity. The right panel shows that as the progressivity of the tax schedule decreases,
the inaction region widens, and the distribution of individual utilities vˆi (·) adjusts endogenously
within the new bands.
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Figure 4: Value functions conditional on observed income v¯ (δ) and effects of progressivity p
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I now characterize the stationary income and deviation distributions, assuming their existence.
I derive the KFE equations (27) and show that their boundary conditions are the following. First,
the density functions f iln y∗,δ and f
s
ln y∗,δ are continuous in δ
∗ and
{
δ, δ¯
}
respectively: for all u ∈ R,
f i,sln y∗,δ
(
u, δ−
)
= f i,sln y∗,δ
(
u, δ+
)
, for δ ∈ {δ, δ∗, δ¯} . (49)
Second, the boundaries δ and δ¯ are absorbing for f iln y∗,δ, so that there is no mass of inactive
individuals at the edges of the inaction region: for all u ∈ R,
f iln y∗,δ (u, δ) = f
i
ln y∗,δ
(
u, δ¯
)
= 0. (50)
Intuitively, this is because individuals who reach a boundary of their inaction region immediately
start searching and leave the inaction state. Third, the density of searchers in a given job converges
to zero as δ → ±∞: for all u ∈ R,
lim
δ→±∞
fsln y∗,δ
(
u− σy
σδ
δ, δ
)
= 0. (51)
Fourth, total flows in and out of δ, δ∗, δ¯ must balance, which yields three functional equations linking
the density functions f iln y∗,δ and f
s
ln y∗,δ. Letting fˆ
x denote the function σyσδ f
x
1 + f
x
2 for x ∈ {i, s},
these conditions write: for all u ∈ R,
fˆ i
(
u, δ∗+
)− fˆ i (u, δ∗−) = 2
σ2δ
(
ρ2fln y∗0 (u) + qf
s
ln y∗ (u)
)
, (52)
fˆ i
(
u, δ+
)
+ fˆs
(
u, δ+
)− fˆs (u, δ−) = 0, (53)
fˆ i
(
u, δ¯−
)
+ fˆs
(
u, δ¯−
)− fˆs (u, δ¯+) = 0. (54)
These equations equate the inflows and outflows of individuals going from one state (inaction,
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search, non-participation) into another, following a change in their wage and hence desired hours,
the reception of a new job opportunity, or a “birth”. Finally, a normalizing condition imposing that
the total mass of individuals in the population is equal to 1 completes the full characterization of
the economy’s steady-state:
ˆ ∞
−∞
ˆ ∞
−∞
[
f iln y∗,δ (u, δ) + f
s
ln y∗,δ (u, δ)
]
dudδ = 1. (55)
Proof of Proposition 4. To derive the KFE equations (27) that must be satisfied by the station-
ary joint distributions f iln y∗,δ and f
s
ln y∗,δ, discretize the processes (ln y
∗, δ) on a two-dimensional
grid with size
(
∆h, 1−p1+1/ε∆h
)
. In the time unit ∆t, ln y∗ moves up by ∆h = σy
√
∆t and δ moves
down by 1−p1+1/ε∆h with probability
1
2
(
1 +
µy
σ2y
∆h
)
. The balanced flow equations for f iln y∗,δ at point
(u, δ) ∈ R× {(δ, δ∗) ∪ (δ∗, δ¯)} write:
f iln y∗,δ (u, δ) = (1− ρ2∆t)
{
1
2
(
1 +
µy
σ2y
∆h
)
f iln y∗,δ
(
u−∆h, δ + 1− p
1 + 1/ε
∆h
)
+
1
2
(
1− µy
σ2y
∆h
)
f iln y∗,δ
(
u+ ∆h, δ − 1− p
1 + 1/ε
∆h
)}
.
Taking a second-order Taylor expansion in ∆h of this equation around 0 and rearranging terms
easily yields (27). We also have f iln y∗,δ = 0 if δ /∈
(
δ, δ¯
)
. The balanced flow equations for fsln y∗,δ at
point (u, δ) ∈ R × {(−∞, δ) ∪ (δ, δ¯) ∪ (δ¯,∞)} write identically, except that the right hand side is
multiplied by the probability (1− q∆t) of exiting the search region in [t, t+ ∆t) due to the arrival
of an adjustment opporturnity.
The boundary conditions (50) to (54) can be derived as follows. The balanced-flow equation for
f iln y∗,δ at the point
(
u, δ¯
)
writes:
f iln y∗,δ
(
u, δ¯
)
= (1− ρ2∆t)
{
1
2
(
1− µy
σ2y
∆h
)
f iln y∗,δ
(
u+ ∆h, δ¯ − 1− p
1 + 1/ε
∆h
)}
.
A first-order Taylor expansion in ∆h around 0 yields f iln y∗,δ
(
u, δ¯
)
= 0, and similarly f iln y∗,δ (u, δ) =
0. Similarly, the balanced flow condition at the boundaries ±∞ for fsln y∗,δ writes
lim
δ→±∞
fs (u, δ)|h constant = 0.
Noting that the condition “h constant” is equivalent to “ (1−p)ε1+ε ln y
∗ + δ constant”, we obtain (51).
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The balanced-flow equation for f iln y∗,δ at the point (u, δ
∗) writes:
f i (u, δ∗) = (1− ρ2∆t)
{
1
2
(
1 +
µy
σ2y
∆h
)
f i
(
u−∆h, δ∗ + 1− p
1 + 1/ε
∆h
)
+
1
2
(
1− µy
σ2y
∆h
)
f i
(
u+ ∆h, δ∗ − 1− p
1 + 1/ε
∆h
)}
+ (1− ρ2∆t) (q∆t)
{
1
2
(
1 +
µy
σ2y
∆h
)∑
δ∈G
f s (u−∆h, δ)
+
1
2
(
1− µy
σ2y
∆h
)∑
δ∈G
fs (u+ ∆h, δ)
}
+ (ρ2∆t)
(
1− p
1 + 1/ε
∆h
)−1
fln y∗0 (u) ,
where G denotes the grid of δ and fln y∗0 denotes the density of frictionless log-incomes at birth.
Taking a first-order Taylor expansion in ∆h around 0 using
∑
δ∈G
fsln y∗,δ (ln y
∗, δ) −−−−→
∆h→0
(
1− p
1 + 1/ε
∆h
)−1
fsln y∗ (ln y
∗)
yields (52). Finally, the balanced flow condition at the boundary δ¯ for fsln y∗,δ writes:
fs
(
u, δ¯
)
= (1− ρ2∆t) (1− q∆t)
{
1
2
(
1 +
µy
σ2y
∆h
)
fs
(
u−∆h, δ¯ + 1− p
1 + 1/ε
∆h
)
+
1
2
(
1− µy
σ2y
∆h
)
fs
(
u+ ∆h, δ¯ − 1− p
1 + 1/ε
∆h
)}
+ (1− ρ2∆t)
{
1
2
(
1− µy
σ2y
∆h
)
f i
(
u+ ∆h, δ¯ − 1− p
1 + 1/ε
∆h
)}
.
A first-order Taylor expansion in ∆h yields (54). Equation (53) is obtained similarly.
Note that changing variables and defining the density
gi (u, δ) =
1− p
1 + 1/ε
f iln y∗,δ
(
u− 1− p
1 + 1/ε
δ, δ
)
implies that gi satisfies the PDE
1
2
σ2δg
i
22 + µδg
i
2 − ρ2gi = 0 on R×
{
(δ, δ∗) ∪ (δ∗, δ¯)} .
Imposing the boundary conditions above on the explicit solution to this differential equation yields,
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after tedious algebra and letting ∆ ≡ δ∗ − δ and ∆¯ ≡ δ¯ − δ∗,
f iln y∗,δ (u, δ) =
f˜
(
u+ 1+1/ε1−p δ
)
rρ22,δ − rρ21,δ
{
e−r
ρ2
1,δ(δ−δ) − e−r
ρ2
2,δ(δ−δ)
e−r1,δ(ρ2)∆ − e−r2,δ(ρ2)∆ I[δ,δ∗] +
er
ρ2
1,δ(δ¯−δ) − er
ρ2
2,δ(δ¯−δ)
er
ρ2
1,δ∆¯ − er
ρ2
2,δ∆¯
I(δ∗,δ¯]
}
fsln y∗,δ (u, δ) =
f˜
(
u+ 1+1/ε1−p δ
)
rρ2+q2,δ − rρ2+q1,δ
e
(
r
ρ2+q
1,δ I(−∞,δ]+r
ρ2+q
2,δ I(δ,∞)
)
(δ−δ)
e−r
ρ2+q
1,δ ∆ − e−r
ρ2+q
2,δ ∆
− e
(
r
ρ2+q
1,δ I(−∞,δ¯]+r
ρ2+q
2,δ I(δ¯,∞)
)
(δ¯−δ)
er
ρ2+q
1,δ ∆¯ − er
ρ2+q
2,δ ∆¯

where the function f˜ (·) satisfies the normalization (55) and the integral equation
f˜ (u) =
(
e−r
ρ2
1,δ∆ − e−r
ρ2
2,δ∆
)(
er
ρ2
1,δ∆¯ − er
ρ2
2,δ∆¯
)
er
ρ2
2,δ∆¯e−r
ρ2
1,δ∆ − e−r
ρ2
2,δ∆er
ρ2
1,δ∆¯
{ 2ρ2
σ2δ
fln y∗0
(
u− 1+1/ε1−p δ∗
)
rρ21,δ − rρ22,δ
+ . . .
. . .+
2q
σ2δ
rρ2+q1,δ − rρ2+q2,δ
ˆ ∞
−∞
f sln y∗,δ
(
u− 1 + 1/ε
1− p δ
∗, δ
)
dδ
}
for all u ∈ R. Now suppose q =∞. The functional equation satisfied by f˜ is simpler:
2ρ2
σyσδ
1+1/ε
1−p
rρ22,δ − rρ21,δ
fln y∗0 (u) =
f˜
(
u+ 1+1/ε1−p δ
)
e−r
ρ2
2,δ∆ − e−r
ρ2
1,δ∆
−
f˜
(
u+ 1+1/ε1−p δ¯
)
er
ρ2
2,δ∆¯ − er
ρ2
1,δ∆¯
−
rρ22,δe−rρ22,δ∆ − rρ21,δe−rρ21,δ∆
e−r
ρ2
2,δ∆ − e−r
ρ2
1,δ∆
− r
ρ2
2,δe
r
ρ2
2,δ∆¯ − rρ21,δer
ρ2
1,δ∆¯
er
ρ2
2,δ∆¯ − er
ρ2
1,δ∆¯
 f˜ (u+ 1 + 1/ε
1− p δ
∗
)
.
Letting f˜ (u) = e
1−p
1+1/ε
r
ρ2
1,δug (u), it is easy to check that the solution g (u) to the equation converges
to a constant as u→∞. This implies that
f iln y∗ (u) =
ˆ δ¯
δ
f iln y∗,δ (u, δ) dδ ∼u→∞ e
r
ρ2
1,yu,
i.e., that the stationary income distribution has a Pareto right tail with coefficient rρ21,y.
Equation (27) has the following interpretation. At a given point (ln y∗, δ), the density is reduced
by the agents who move away from there, and is increased by those who move there from a former
deviation δ′, following an increase (resp., decrease) in their wage if δ′ > δ (resp., δ′ < δ). These flows
occur both because of the drift µw (second and third terms of (27)) and the volatility σw (fourth to
sixth terms of (27)) of individual productivities. Moreover, the distribution loses mass at the death
rate ρ2, plus the hours adjustment rate q for the searchers. In the steady-state, these flows in and
out of (ln y∗, δ) must balance on net and are thus equal to zero. Note that these equations do not
hold at δ∗ for f iln y∗,δ, and at
{
δ, δ¯
}
for f sln y∗,δ, where the inflows from births and from endogenous
adjustments produce kinks in the densities.
The top two graphs of Figure 5 show the distribution of taxable incomes (left panel) and dis-
46
posable incomes (right panel), and how they change when the tax schedule goes from the U.S. rate
of progressivity to a linear tax rate. The mean and variance of both distributions are lower when p
is higher; the tails are thinner, to a much larger extent in the case of the disposable income distri-
bution than of the pre-tax income distribution. The bottom left panel of Figure 5 shows the wage,
taxable income and disposable income distributions in log-log scale. This representation illustrates
clearly the fact that those distributions all have left and right Pareto tails, corresponding to the
asymptotic straight lines whose slopes are equal to the Pareto coefficients. The smaller the slopes
in absolute value, the more unequal the distribution: the wage (or productivity) distribution is the
most equal, the taxable income distribution is the most unequal (due to the positive labor supply
elasticity); the inequality of disposable incomes is smaller than that of taxable incomes and closer
to that of wages due to the positive rate of progressivity. Finally, the bottom right panel of Figure
5 shows the inactive individuals’ stationary distributions of deviations δ conditional on income y
for several values of y, along with the boundaries of the optimal inaction region
(
δ, δ∗, δ¯
)
.
Figure 5: Stationary income distributions
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A.2 Proofs and additional results for Sections 4 and 5
I first derive the formulas (39) and (40) characterizing the optimal taxes in the frictionless model.
Proof of equations (39) and (40). Consider a perturbation (dτ, dp) of the baseline tax system.
The first-order change in the tax liability at income y is, to a first-order in (dτ, dp) (ignoring the
term o (dτ, dp)),
T˜ (y)− T (y) =
(
y − 1− τ − dτ
1− p− dp y
1−p−dp
)
−
(
y − 1− τ
1− py
1−p
)
=
1
1− py
1−pdτ +
(
ln y − 1
1− p
)
1− τ
1− py
1−pdp = ∂τ (y) dτ + ∂p (y) dp,
and the first-order change in the marginal tax rate at income y is
T˜ ′ (y)− T ′ (y) =y−pdτ + (1− τ) y−p ln ydp = ∂′τ (y) dτ + ∂′p (y) dp.
Thus, letting fy (y) denote the stationary density of incomes, we have
ˆ ∞
0
[
∂τ (y)− T
′ (y)
1− T ′ (y)
ε
1 + pε
y∂′τ (y)
]
fy (y) dy =
1
1− τ
{
1 + ε
1 + pε
1− τ
1− pE
[
y1−p
]− ε
1 + pε
E [y]
}
,
ˆ ∞
0
[
∂p (y)− T
′ (y)
1− T ′ (y)
ε
1 + pε
y∂′p (y)
]
fy (y) dy =− 1
1− p
1− τ
1− pE
[
y1−p
]− ε
1 + pε
E [y ln y]
+
1 + ε
1 + pε
1− τ
1− pE
[
y1−p ln y
]
.
In the frictionless model, the income distribution fy (y) is double-Pareto-lognormal with param-
eters
(
rρ21,y, r
ρ2
2,y,my, s
2
y
)
, where my = 1+ε1+pεmw +
ε ln(1−τ)
1+pε and sy =
1+ε
1+pεsw. We can thus derive
directly formulas (39) and (40). The parameters of the economy are affected by the perturbation
in the following way:
dmy
dτ
= − 1
1− τ
ε
1 + pε
,
d
dτ
{
sy, µy, σy, r
ρ2
1,y, r
ρ2
2,y
}
= 0,
d
dp
{
my, sy, µy, σy, r
ρ2
1,y, r
ρ2
2,y
}
=
ε
1 + pε
{
−my,−sy,−µy,−σy, rρ21,y, rρ22,y
}
.
Thus the density of incomes satisfies, letting Φi ≡ Φ
(
ln y−my
sy
+ rρ2i,ysy
)
for i ∈ {1, 2} with similar
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definitions of Φci and ϕi, and ei ≡ |
r
ρ2
1,y|rρ22,y
|rρ21,y|+rρ22,y e
1
2(r
ρ2
i,y)
2
s2y−rρ2i,ymy ,
fy (y) =
∣∣∣rρ21,y∣∣∣ rρ22,y∣∣∣rρ21,y∣∣∣+ rρ22,y
{
e
1
2(r
ρ2
1,y)
2
s2y−rρ21,ymyyr
ρ2
1,y−1Φ1 + e
1
2(r
ρ2
2,y)
2
s2y−rρ22,ymyyr
ρ2
2,y−1Φc2
}
,
dfy (y)
dτ
=
1
1− τ
ε
1 + pε
∣∣∣rρ21,y∣∣∣ rρ22,y∣∣∣rρ21,y∣∣∣+ rρ22,y
{
e
1
2(r
ρ2
1,y)
2
s2y−rρ21,ymyyr
ρ2
1,y−1
[
rρ21,yΦ1 +
1
sy
ϕ1
]
+e
1
2(r
ρ2
2,y)
2
s2y−rρ22,ymyyr
ρ2
2,y−1
[
rρ22,yΦ
c
2 −
1
sy
ϕ2
]}
,
dfy (y)
dp
=
ε
1 + pε
∣∣∣rρ21,y∣∣∣ rρ22,y∣∣∣rρ21,y∣∣∣+ rρ22,y
{
e
1
2(r
ρ2
1,y)
2
s2y−rρ21,ymyyr
ρ2
1,y−1
[(
1 + rρ21,y ln y
)
Φ1 + ln y
ϕ1
sy
]
+e
1
2(r
ρ2
2,y)
2
s2y−rρ22,ymyyr
ρ2
2,y−1
[(
1 + rρ22,y ln y
)
Φc2 − ln y
ϕc2
sy
]}
.
The first-order change in tax revenue due to a perturbation dτ in the frictionless model, dR
∗(T )
dτ , is
given by
dR∗
dτ
=
d
dτ
{ˆ ∞
0
(
y − 1− τ
1− py
1−p
)
fy (y) dy
}
=
1
1− p
ˆ ∞
0
y1−pfy (y) dy +
ˆ ∞
0
(
y − 1− τ
1− py
1−p
)
dfy (y)
dτ
dy
=− 1
1− τ
ε
1 + pε
E [y] +
1
1− τ
1 + ε
1 + pε
1− τ
1− pE
[
y1−p
]
,
where the last line is obtained by integrating by parts to compute the integrals of the form´∞
0 e
(rρ2i,y−1+α) ln y 1
sy
ϕidy with r
ρ2
i,y + α < 0. Similarly, the effect of a perturbation dp is given
by
dR∗
dp
=
ˆ ∞
0
(
− 1
1− p
1− τ
1− py
1−p +
1− τ
1− py
1−p ln y
)
fy (y) dy +
ˆ ∞
0
(
y − 1− τ
1− py
1−p
)
dfy (y)
dp
dy
=− 1
1− p
1− τ
1− pE
[
y1−p
]− ε
1 + pε
E [y ln y] +
1 + ε
1 + pε
1− τ
1− pE
[
y1−p ln y
]
,
again integrating by parts to compute the integrals of the form
´∞
0 e
(rρ2i,y−1+α) ln y ln y 1syϕidy. Note
that a different way of showing these results is to use the KFE characterization of the income
distribution to deduce that
f ,τ+dτy (y) =
dτ→0
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
)
f τy
((
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
)
y
)
+ o (dτ) ,
f ,p+dpy (y) =
dp→0
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)
y
ε
1+pε
dp
fpy
(
y
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
)
+ o (dp) ,
which mean that the individuals with income y before the perturbation dτ (resp., dp) end up
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earning y′ =
(
1− ε1+pε dτ1−τ
)
y (resp., y′ = y1−
ε
1+pε
dp) after the perturbation, so that f τ+dτy (y′) dy′ =
f τy (y) dy (resp., f
p+dp
y (y′) dy′ = fpy (y) dy). It is then straightforward (with a change of variables in
the integral) to obtain the formulas above:
dR∗
dτ
=
1
dτ
{(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
) ˆ ∞
0
(
y − 1− τ − dτ
1− p y
1−p
)
f τ+dτy
((
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
)
y
)
dy −R
}
=
1
dτ
{(
− ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
) ˆ ∞
0
yf τy (y) dy +
(
1 + ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
) ˆ ∞
0
1− τ
1− py
1−pf τy (y) dy
}
,
and similarly for a perturbation dp.
The first-order change in the government objective due to a perturbation dτ in the frictionless
model is given by:
dW ∗ (T )
dτ
=
d
dτ
{ˆ ∞
0
V (y) fy (y) dy
}
=
1
dτ
{ˆ ∞
0
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ−dτ
1−p y
1−p
)1−γ
ρ+ β − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
f τ+dτy (y) dy −
ˆ ∞
0
V (y) fy (y) dy
}
=
1
dτ
ˆ ∞
0
{ 1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−p
{(
1− dτ1−τ
)(
1− ε1+pε dτ1−τ
)1−p}
y1−p
)1−γ
ρ+ β − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
−
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ+ β − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
}
fy (y) dy
=−
ˆ ∞
0
(
1+pε
1+ε
)−γ (
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)−γ
ρ+ β − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
y1−p
1− pfy (y) dy
=− λ∗
ˆ ∞
0
ω∗ (y) ∂τ (y) fy (y) dy,
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and similarly for a perturbation dp:
dW ∗ (T )
dp
=
1
dp
{ˆ ∞
0
1
1−γ
(
1+(p+dp)ε
1+ε
1−τ
1−(p+dp)y
1−(p+dp)
)1−γ
ρ+ β − (1− γ)
(
1− 11−p 1+ε1+pεdp
)
µc − 12 (1− γ)2
(
1− 11−p 1+ε1+pεdp
)2
σ2c
×
. . .× fp+dpy (y) dy −W ∗ (T )
}
=
1
dp
{1 + 1− γ
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp−
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
(
(1− γ)µc + (1− γ)2 σ2c
)
ρ+ β − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
dp
× . . .
. . .×
ˆ ∞
0
1
1−γ
((
1− 1+ε1+pε ln ydp
)
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ+ β − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
fy (y) dy −W ∗ (T )
}
=− λ∗
ˆ ∞
0
ω∗ (y) ∂p (y) fy (y) dy − λ∗
ˆ ∞
0
dρ
dp
ωˆ∗ (y) fy (y) dy.
We finally obtain the optimal tax schedule by imposing that
0 =
dW ∗
dτ
+ λ∗
dR∗
dτ
=
dW ∗
dp
+ λ∗
dR∗
dp
,
which proves formulas (39) and (40) in the frictionless model.
Next I first formulas (31) and (39) in the frictional model.
Proof of Propositions 5 and 6. I show that a perturbation dτ of the tax schedule has the fol-
lowing first-order effects on the density functions in the frictional model: for all u, δ,
fx,τ+dτln y∗,δ (u, δ) = f
x,τ
ln y∗,δ
(
u+
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ , δ
)
i.e., fx,τ+dτy∗,δ (y, δ) =dτ→0
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
)
fx,τy∗,δ
((
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
)
y, δ
)
, (56)
for x ∈ {i, s}. To see this, consider the functions
gx (u, δ) ≡ fx,τln y∗,δ
(
u+
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ , δ
)
.
I show that gi, gs satisfy the KFE and boundary conditions that define the functions f i,τ+dτln y∗,δ and
fs,τ+dτln y∗,δ , respectively, which will imply the result. First, note that µy, σy, µδ, σδ, δ, δ
∗, δ¯ do not depend
on τ . We have, for all u ∈ R, all δ ∈ (δ, δ∗) ∪ (δ∗, δ¯) if x = i, and all δ ∈ R \ {δ, δ¯} if x = s, letting
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uˆ ≡ u+ ε1+pε dτ1−τ ,
− (β + qIf s) g (u, δ)− µyg1 (u, δ) + µδg2 (u, δ) + 1
2
σ2yg11 (u, δ) +
1
2
σ2δg22 (u, δ)− σyσδg12 (u, δ)
=− (β + qIf s) fx,τln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ)− µy∂1fx,τln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ) + µδ∂2fx,τln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ)
+
1
2
σ2y∂11f
x,τ
ln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ) +
1
2
σ2δ∂22f
x,τ
ln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ)− σyσδ∂12fx,τln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ) = 0,
where the last equality follows from the KFE solved by fx,τln y∗,δ, evaluated at (uˆ, δ). Next, note that
the density of incomes at birth satisfies
f τ+dτln y∗0
(u) =
1
sy
√
2pi
e
− 1
2s2y
(
u− ε
1+pε
ln(1−τ−dτ)− 1+ε
1+pε
mw
)2
= f τln y∗0
(
u+
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
)
.
Thus we have
gs1
(
u, δ¯+
)− gs1 (u, δ¯−)− 1− p1 + 1/ε (gs2 (u, δ¯+)− gs2 (u, δ¯−))−
(
gi1
(
u, δ¯−
)− 1− p
1 + 1/ε
gi2
(
u, δ¯−
))
=∂1f
s,τ
ln y∗,δ
(
uˆ, δ¯+
)− ∂1f s,τln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ¯−)− 1− p1 + 1/ε (∂2fs,τln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ¯+)− ∂2fs,τln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ¯−))
−
(
∂1f
i,τ
ln y∗,δ
(
uˆ, δ¯−
)− 1− p
1 + 1/ε
∂2f
i,τ
ln y∗,δ
(
uˆ, δ¯−
))
= 0,
where the last equality follows from equation (54) satisfied by f τln y∗,δ, evaluated at (uˆ, δ). The
corresponding equation (53) for gi, gs is shown in the same way. Similarly,
gi1
(
u, δ∗+
)− gi1 (u, δ∗−)− 1− p1 + 1/ε (gi2 (u, δ∗+)− gi2 (u, δ∗−))− 2σyσδ
(
βf τln y∗0 (uˆ) + qf
s,τ (uˆ)
)
=∂1f
i,τ
ln y∗,δ
(
uˆ, δ∗+
)− ∂1f i,τln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ∗−)− 1− p1 + 1/ε (∂2f i,τln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ∗+)− ∂2f i,τln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ∗−))
− 2
σyσδ
(
βf τln y∗0 (uˆ) + qf
s,τ (uˆ)
)
= 0,
where the last equality follows from the third conservation law satisfied by f τln y∗,δ, evaluated at
(uˆ, δ). Finally check the other boundary conditions: we have gi
(
u, δ¯
)
= f i,τln y∗,δ
(
uˆ, δ¯
)
= 0 and
similarly gi (u, δ) = 0, where the last equalities follow from the corresponding boundary conditions
of f i. Similarly, we have, for all h ∈ R,
lim
δ→±∞
gs
(
h− 1 + 1/ε
1− p δ, δ
)
= fsln y∗,δ
(
h+
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ −
1 + 1/ε
1− p δ, δ
)
= 0.
Finally, we have
´∞
−∞
´∞
−∞
{
gi + gs
}
(u, δ) dudδ = 1, which completes the proof that gi = f i,τ+dτln y∗,δ
and gs = fs,τ+dτln y∗,δ .
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Equation (56) implies that, for x ∈ {i, s}, for all v, δ,
fx,τ+dτln y,δ (v, δ) =f
x,τ+dτ
ln y∗,δ (v − δ, δ) = fx,τln y∗,δ
(
v +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ − δ, δ
)
= fx,τln y,δ
(
v +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ , δ
)
,
and thus the following relationship between the marginal densities of income given taxes τ and
τ + dτ holds:
f τ+dτln y (v) =
ˆ ∞
−∞
{
f i,τ+dτln y,δ (v, δ) + f
s,τ+dτ
ln y,δ (v, δ)
}
dδ
=
ˆ ∞
−∞
{
f i,τln y,δ
(
v +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ , δ
)
+ fs,τln y,δ
(
v +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ , δ
)}
dδ = f τln y
(
v +
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
)
.
We therefore find, with the same change of variables as in the previous proof:
dR
dτ
=
d
dτ
{ˆ ∞
−∞
(
eu − 1− τ
1− pe
(1−p)u
)
fln y (u) du
}
=
1
dτ
{ˆ ∞
−∞
(
eu − 1− τ − dτ
1− p e
(1−p)u
)
fln y
(
u+
ε
1 + pε
dτ
1− τ
)
du−R
}
=
ˆ ∞
−∞
(
− ε
1 + pε
1
1− τ e
u +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
e(1−p)u
)
fln y (u) du
=− ε
1 + pε
1
1− τ E [y] +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
E
[
y1−p
]
.
Note that the same computations (keeping only the term eu in the integral) imply that ddτE [y] =
− ε1+pε 11−τE [y], proving equation (31). Finally,
dW
dτ
=
d
dτ
{ˆ ∞
−∞
ˆ ∞
−∞
Vi (eu, δ) f iln y∗,δ (u, δ) dudδ +
ˆ ∞
−∞
ˆ ∞
−∞
Vs (eu, δ) fsln y∗,δ (u, δ) dudδ
}
=
∑
x∈{i,s}
1
dτ
ˆ ∞
−∞
ˆ ∞
−∞
{
V∗,τ+dτ
(
e
v− ε
1+pε
dτ
1−τ
)
− V∗,τ (ev)
}
v˜x (δ) f
x,(τ)
ln y,δ (v, δ) dvdδ
=− λ
ˆ ∞
0
ω (y) ∂τ (y) fy (y) dy.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 6.
I finally prove equation (41).
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose first that the following assumption (∗) holds:
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
(p+ dp) =
(
1− 1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
){
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
=
σδ (p+ dp)
σδ
{
δ, δ∗, δ¯
}
.
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Then the perturbation dp affects the densities of income as follows:
fx,p+dpln y∗,δ (u, δ) =
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
× . . .
fx,pln y∗,δ
((
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)
u,
(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)
≡ gx (u, δ) ,
(57)
for x ∈ {i, s}. To see this, I show that gi, gs satisfy the KFE and boundary conditions that define
the functions f i,p+dpln y∗,δ and f
s,p+dp
ln y∗,δ , respectively.
For any δ, u, let δˇ ≡
(
1− 11−p 1+ε1+pεdp
)
δ, δˆ ≡
(
1− 11−p 1+ε1+pεdp
)
δ, and uˆ =
(
1 + ε1+pεdp
)
u. First,
we have, for all u ∈ R, all δ ∈ (δˇ, δˇ∗) ∪ (δˇ∗, ˇ¯δ) if x = i, and all δ ∈ R \ {δˇ, ˇ¯δ} if x = s,
− (β + qIfs) gx −
(
1− ε
1 + pε
dp
)
µyg
x
1 +
1− p
1 + 1ε
(
1− 1
1− pdp
)(
1− ε
1 + pε
dp
)
µyg
x
2
+
1
2
(
1− ε
1 + pε
dp
)2
σ2yg
x
11 +
1
2
(
1− p
1 + 1ε
)2(
1− 1
1− pdp
)2(
1− ε
1 + pε
dp
)2
σ2yg
x
22
− 1− p
1 + 1ε
(
1− 1
1− pdp
)(
1− ε
1 + pε
dp
)2
σ2yg
x
12
=
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
){
− (β + qIf s) f i,(p)ln y∗,δ − µy
∂fpln y∗,δ
∂u
+
1− p
1 + 1ε
µy
∂fpln y∗,δ
∂δ
. . .+
1
2
σ2y
∂2fpln y∗,δ
∂u2
+
1
2
(
1− p
1 + 1ε
)2
σ2y
∂2fpln y∗,δ
∂2δ
− 1− p
1 + 1ε
σ2y
∂2fpln y∗,δ
∂δ∂u
}∣∣∣∣∣∣
(uˆ,δˆ)
= 0,
where the last equality follows from the KFE solved by fpln y∗,δ, evaluated at
(
uˆ, δˆ
)
. Thus gx satisfies
the KFE of fp+dpln y∗,δ for all δˆ ∈ (δ, δ∗) ∪
(
δ∗, δ¯
)
if x = i and δˆ ∈ R \ {δ, δ¯} if x = s, i.e. the same
domains as those of fp+dpln y∗,δ. Next, we have, for δ ∈
{
δ¯, δ
}
,
gs1
(
u, δ+
)− gs1 (u, δ−)− 1− p1 + 1/ε
(
1− dp
1− p
)(
gs2
(
u, δ+
)− gs2 (u, δ−))
−
(
gi1
(
u, δ−
)− 1− p
1 + 1/ε
(
1− dp
1− p
)
gi2
(
u, δ−
))
=
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)2(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
){
∂fs,pln y∗,δ
∂u
(
uˆ, δˆ+
)
− ∂f
s,p
ln y∗,δ
∂u
(
uˆ, δˆ−
)}
− 1− p
1 + 1/ε
(
1− dp
1− p
)(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)2{∂fs,pln y∗,δ
∂δ
(
uˆ, δˆ+
)
− ∂f
s,p
ln y∗,δ
∂δ
(
uˆ, δˆ−
)}
−
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)2(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
){
∂f i,pln y∗,δ
∂u
(
uˆ, δˆ−
)
− 1− p
1 + 1/ε
∂f i,pln y∗,δ
∂δ
(
uˆ, δˆ−
)}
= 0,
where the last equality follows from the corresponding conservation law satisfied by fpln y∗,δ, evaluated
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at
(
uˆ, δˆ
)
, and, noting that
βfp+dpln y∗0
(u) + qfs,p+dpln y∗ (u) =
β(
1− ε1+pεdp
)
sy
√
2pi
e
− 1
2(1− ε1+pε dp)
2
s2y
(
u−
(
1− ε
1+pε
dp
)
my
)2
+ q
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)ˆ δ¯(p+dp)
δ(p+dp)
fs,pln y∗,δ
(
uˆ, δˆ
)
dδ,
we obtain
gi1
(
u, δ∗+
)− gi1 (u, δ∗−)− 1− p1 + 1/ε
(
1− dp
1− p
)(
gi2
(
u, δ∗+
)− gi2 (u, δ∗−))
−−
2
σyσδ(
1− 11−p 1+ε1+pεdp
)(
1− ε1+pεdp
)2
{
β
sy
√
2pi
e
− 1
2s2y
(uˆ−my)2
+ q
ˆ δ¯
δ
fs,pln y∗,δ (uˆ, δ) dδ
}
=
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)2(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
){
∂f i,pln y∗,δ
∂u
(
uˆ, δˆ∗+
)
− ∂f
i,p
ln y∗,δ
∂u
(
uˆ, δˆ∗−
)}
− 1− p
1 + 1/ε
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)2(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
){
∂f i,pln y∗,δ
∂δ
(
uˆ, δˆ∗+
)
− ∂f
i,p
ln y∗,δ
∂δ
(
uˆ, δˆ∗−
)}
− 1(
1− dp1−p
)(
1− ε1+pεdp
)(
1− ε1+pεdp
)2 2σyσδ
{
β
sy
√
2pi
e
− 1
2s2y
(uˆ−my)2
+ qfs,pln y∗ (uˆ)
}
= 0,
where the last equality follows from the corresponding conservation law satisfied by fpln y∗,δ, evaluated
at
(
uˆ, δˆ∗
)
. The remaining boundary conditions are proved similarly, which concludes the proof.
Note that equation (57) implies
f
(p+dp)
y,δ (y, δ) = e
−δf (p+dp)y∗,δ
(
ye−δ, δ
)
=
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
e
ε
1+pε
ln ydp × . . .
× . . . e
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
f
(p)
y,δ
(
e
(
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
)
ln y+
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
,
(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)
.
Second, I compute the effect of a perturbation dp on government revenue:
dR
dp
=
d
dp
{ˆ ∞
0
(
y − 1− τ
1− py
1−p
)
fpy (y) dy
}
=
ˆ ∞
0
(
ln y − 1
1− p
)
1− τ
1− py
1−pfpy (y) dy +
1
dp
ˆ ∞
0
(
y − 1− τ
1− py
1−p
){
fp+dpy (y)− fpy (y)
}
dy.
The first term in the right hand side is the standard mechanical effect M of the perturbation,
as in the frictionless model. I now decompose the second integral into three parts: dRdp = M +
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1
dp (B1 +B2 +B3), where
B1 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
T (y)
{(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)2
y
ε
1+pε
dp
fpy,δ
(
y
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
,
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)
− . . .
. . .− fpy,δ (y, δ)
}
dydδ
B2 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
T (y)
{(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
e
ε
1+pε
ln ydp
e
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp × . . .
. . .× fpy,δ
(
e
(
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
)
ln y+
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
,
(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)
−
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)2
y
ε
1+pε
dp
fpy,δ
(
y
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
,
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)}
dydδ
B3 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
T (y)
{
fp+dpy,δ (y, δ)−
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
e
ε
1+pε
ln ydp × . . .
×e
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
fpy,δ
(
e
(
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
)
ln y+
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
,
(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)}
dydδ,
and I compute each term in turn.
[B1] : We have
B1 =
ˆ ∞
0
((
1− ε
1 + pε
ln ydp
)
y − 1− τ
1− p
(
1− ε (1− p)
1 + pε
ln ydp
)
y1−p
)
fpy (y) dy
−
ˆ ∞
0
(
y − 1− τ
1− py
1−p
)
fpy (y) dy
=− ε
1 + pε
dp
ˆ ∞
0
(
y − (1− τ) y1−p) ln yfpy (y) dy
=− ε
1 + pε
dp
ˆ ∞
0
T ′ (y)
1− T ′ (y)y∂
′
p (y) f
p
y (y) dy,
which is the standard behavioral effect found in frictionless models.
[B2] : We have
B2 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
{
T
(
y
1− ε
1+pε
dp
e
−
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
)
− T
(
y
1− ε
1+pε
dp
)}
fpy,δ (y, δ) dydδ
=−
(
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
− ε
1 + pε
)
dp
ˆ ∞
0
T ′ (y)
[ˆ ∞
−∞
δfδ|y (δ |y ) dδ
]
yfy (y) dy.
We can show that this term is related to the elasticity of income with respect to a proportional
change in the parameters Y = {µy, σy,my, sy} (which all have elasticity − ε1+pε with respect to p),
keeping the parameters D =
{
µδ, σδ, δ, δ
∗, δ¯
}
constant, i.e., 1−Fy(y)yfy(y)
∂ ln(1−Fy(y))
∂ lnY
∣∣∣
D
= ∂ ln y∂ lnY .
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[B3] : We have
B3 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
T (y)
{
f
{
δ˜,δ˜∗,˜¯δ
}
y,δ (y, δ)− fpy,δ (y, δ)
}
dydδ
=
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
T (y)
{(
δ˜ − δ
) ∂fy,δ (y, δ)
∂δ
+
(
δ˜∗ − δ∗
) ∂fy,δ (y, δ)
∂δ∗
+
(
˜¯δ − δ¯
) ∂fy,δ (y, δ)
∂δ¯
}
dydδ
=dp
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
T (y)
{ ∑
δi∈{δ,δ∗,δ¯}
δi
(
∂ ln |δi|
∂p
−
(
− 1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
))
∂fy,δ (y, δ)
∂δi
}
dydδ,
where the first equality follows from the observation that the KFE and boundary conditions defining
the density fx,p+dpln y∗,δ (u, δ) is solved by the function
fx,p+dpln y∗,δ (u, δ) =
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
f
x,
{
δ˜,δ˜∗,˜¯δ
}
ln y∗,δ
(
uˆ, δˆ
)
,
where the r.h.s. is the density given the progressivity p and the parameters{
δ˜, δ˜∗, ˜¯δ
}
≡
(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
){
δ (p+ dp) , δ∗ (p+ dp) , δ¯ (p+ dp)
}
,
which implies that
fx,p+dpy,δ (y, δ) =
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
e
ε
1+pε
ln ydp × . . .
. . .× e
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
f
x,
{
δ˜,δ˜∗,˜¯δ
}
y,δ
(
e
(
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
)
ln y
e
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
,
(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)
and leads to the expression above after a change of variables. Gathering all the terms, we obtain
dR
dp
=
ˆ ∞
0
(
ln y − 1
1− p
)
1− τ
1− py
1−pfy (y) dy
−
(
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
− ε
1 + pε
) ˆ ∞
0
T ′ (y) yE [δ |y ] fy (y) dy
− ε
1 + pε
ˆ ∞
0
T ′ (y)
1− T ′ (y)y∂
′
p (y) fy (y) dy
+
ˆ ∞
0
T (y)
[
3∑
i=1
(
d ln |δi|
dp
− d ln |σδ|
dp
)
Ξi
]
fy (y) dy
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Third, I compute the effect of a perturbation dp on the government objective:
dW
dp
=
∑
x∈{i,s}
d
dp
{ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
V∗ (y) v¯x (δ) fx,py,δ (y, δ) dydδ
}
=
d
dp

ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
v¯p (y, δ) fpy,δ (y, δ) dydδ
 .
I now decompose the integral into three parts: dWdp =
1
dp (W1 +W2 +W3 +W4), where
W1 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
[ 1
1−γ
(
1+(p+dp)ε
1+ε
1−τ
1−p−dpy
1−p+dp
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)
(
1− 1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
dp
)
µc − 12 (1− γ)2
(
1− 1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
dp
)2
σ2c
−
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
]
v¯p (y, δ) fpy,δ (y, δ) dydδ
W2 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
{
v¯p
(
y
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
,
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)
× . . .
. . .×
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)2
y
ε
1+pε
dp
fpy,δ
(
y
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
,
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)
− v¯p (y, δ) fpy,δ (y, δ)
}
dydδ
W3 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
{
v¯p
(
y
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
,
(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)
× . . .
. . .×
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
e
ε
1+pε
ln ydp
e
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp × . . .
. . .× fpy,δ
(
e
(
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
)
ln y+
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
,
(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)
− v¯p
(
y
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
,
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)2
y
ε
1+pε
dp
fpy,δ
(
y
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
,
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)}
dydδ
W4 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
{
v¯p+dp (y, δ) fp+dpy,δ (y, δ)− . . .
. . .− v¯p
(
y
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
,
(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
e
ε
1+pε
ln ydp × . . .
. . .× e
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
fpy,δ
(
e
(
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
)
ln y+
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
,
(
1 +
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
dp
)
δ
)}
dydδ
and I compute each term in turn. First, we easily find
W1 +W2 =λ
ˆ ∞
0
[
∂p (y)ω (y) +
d lnρ
dp
ωˆ (y)
]
fpy (y) dy,
which are the standard (static and dynamic) terms already present in the frictionless formula. Next,
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we have
W3 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
× . . .
. . .×
{
e−(1−γ)δdpv¯
(
ye
− 1
1−p δdp, δ
)
− v¯ (y, δ)
}
fpy,δ (y, δ) dydδ
=− dp
1− p
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
yδ
∂
∂y

1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
v¯ (y, δ)
 fpy,δ (y, δ) dydδ
=−
[
1
1− p
1 + ε
1 + pε
− ε
1 + pε
]
dp
ˆ ∞
0
{ˆ ∞
−∞
δ
∂V¯ (y, δ)
∂ ln y
fδ|y (δ |y ) dδ
}
fy (y) dy.
Finally, we have
W4 =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
v¯p (y, δ)
{
fp+dpy,δ (y, δ)− . . .
. . .−
(
1 +
ε
1 + pε
dp
)
e
ε
1+pε
ln ydp
e
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
fpy,δ
(
e
(
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
)
ln y+
[
1
1−p
1+ε
1+pε
− ε
1+pε
]
δdp
, δ
)}
dydδ
+
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
1
1−γ
(
1+pε
1+ε
1−τ
1−py
1−p
)1−γ
ρ1 + ρ2 − (1− γ)µc − 12 (1− γ)2 σ2c
{
v¯p+dp (y, δ)− v¯p
(
y
1+ ε
1+pε
dp
, δ
)}
fpy,δ (y, δ) dydδ
=
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
V¯p (y, δ)
∑
δi∈{δ,δ∗,δ¯}
{(
∂ ln |δi|
∂p
− d lnσδ
dp
)
∂ ln fy,δ (y, δ)
∂ ln δi
fδ|y (δ |y )
}
fy (y) dydδ
+
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ∞
−∞
V¯p (y, δ)
{
∂ ln v¯p (y, δ)
∂p
− ε
1 + pε
ln y
∂ ln v¯p (y, δ)
∂ ln y
}
fδ|y (δ |y ) fy (y) dydδ,
where the first equality uses the fact that f iδ|y (δ |y ) = f iδ|y
(
δ¯ |y ) = 0, and the second equality is
obtained similarly as the extensive elasticity term on government revenue above.
Figure 6 plots the extensive margin elasticities
(
d ln|δ|
dp − d ln|σδ|dp
)
Ξ (y) and
(
d ln δ¯
dp − d ln|σδ|dp
)
Ξ¯ (y)
for ε = 0.33 (left panel) and ε = 1 (right panel).
Figure 6: Extensive margin elasticities: ε = 0.33 and ε = 1
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Figure 7 plots the revenue effects of the tax reform disaggregated by income, that is,
−T ′ (y) yε
∗ (y)
1− T ′ (y)Ψ
′
p (y) + T (y)
 3∑
i=1
d ln |δi||σδ|
dp
Ξi (y)
 ,
for ε = 0.33 (left panel) and ε = 1 (right panel) in the frictionless and the frictional models.
Figure 7: Revenue effects of tax reforms
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Elasticities: revenue effects of progressivity: ǫ  = 0.33
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Figure 8 plots the welfare effects of increasing progressivity disaggregated by income for ε = 0.33
and ε = 1, that is, −
[
ω (y) Ψp (y) +
d lnρ
dp ωˆ (y)
]
+
[∑3
i=1
d ln
|δi|
|σδ|
dp Ωi (y) + Ω˜ (y)
]
.
Figure 8: Welfare effects of tax reforms
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Marginal social welfare weights: Welfare effects of progressivity
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